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Introduction: 
 
Despite some recent economic progress, there is still widespread poverty and 
severe inequality in developing countries. According to the World Bank there are over 
925 million hungry or undernourished people worldwide. More than 80 percent of people 
in the world live in countries whose income inequality is rising. Over 2.1 billion people 
globally live on less than two dollars a day, with over 880 million people facing absolute 
poverty and living on less than one dollar a day. Three out of four people living on less 
than $1 a day live in rural areas. These impacts have been magnified by the recent global 
recession, as rising food prices and a decrease in remittances have pushed between 130 
and 155 million people back into poverty. 1   
Particularly in lower income countries, the impoverished are faced with poor and 
insufficiently funded health care systems, restricted access to adequate nutrition and 
potable water, low agricultural yields, and poor soil quality.   Not only are the services in 
short supply for the poor, but the predicament of the poor often limits their capacity to 
avail themselves of these services.  Parents may opt for keeping their children out of 
school, either to employ their labor or to avoid the costs of transportation and school fees.  
Healthcare may also entail costs that parents are reluctant to bear.  Thus, people are often 
in poor health which decreases their productivity and learning capacity. These issues 
combined, along with inadequate education systems, poor school attendance, and teacher 
absenteeism, all retard human capital accumulation.  
These issues are exacerbated by inefficient and corrupt governments, poor 
institutional development, and inadequate or nonexistent physical infrastructure. At the 
                                                 
1
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same time, geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, and low aggregate levels of skilled 
individuals often make impoverished areas unattractive to investors. Low skilled peoples 
are often subject to poor labor conditions, and are often unprotected from labor market 
upheavals. These interdependent factors work together to keep millions of people trapped 
in vicious intergenerational cycles of poverty. Children often inherit the poverty of their 
parents, and are increasingly marginalized from the global economy.  
These conditions not only limit the quality of life for the impoverished, but in fact 
impede the overall economic progress of developing countries. Having a large segment of 
the population operating outside of the broader economy because of inadequate skill 
development or poor access to financial markets results in many of the country’s 
potential resources being unutilized. At the same time, negative social elements 
associated with poverty, such as crime and slum communities, can intensify these 
problems and impede the effectiveness of other factors.  Recently, governments of 
developing countries have attempted to address these complex problems by adopting 
demand side social assistance programs specifically targeting human capital formation. 
These programs condition cash transfers on certain behaviors of the recipients. Mexico 
and Brazil were pioneers of these programs.  
Brazil’s Bolsa Escola program emerged from a long history of local level 
conditionality programs. Throughout the 1990’s many local community’s implemented 
programs which had welfare transfers conditioned on school attendance. By 1998 there 
were over 60 programs serving 200,000 families in Brazil, with some receiving matching 
federal money. In 2001 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, encouraged by electoral 
politics, issued an executive order uniting many of the local programs into a 
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comprehensive national framework entitled the Bolsa Escola program.2 The program’s 
design augmented existing municipal cash transfer policies, allowing local communities 
to supplement and target national wealth transfer, while also establishing a uniform 
framework for household targeting. 3    
Mexico implemented a federal CCT program in 1997. Progresa, renamed 
Oportunidades, was modeled on the Brazilian experience. The program provided cash 
and in kind benefits to households conditional upon children regularly attending school 
until the age of 18, and regular visits to health centers for the entire family.4 Originally 
covering 300,000 households, it expanded to over 2.5 million by the year 2000. 
Oportunidades aims to improve women’s position in society; it gives the cash transfer to 
the female head of household and pays a 15 percent premium for girls to remain in 
school.   
The program targeted municipalities according to a marginal classification 
scheme. It then used a socio-demographic study to determine which households would be 
eligible for transfers. Finally, community feedback was incorporated to verify the initial 
request should be accepted.  By implementing standard mechanisms for determining 
recipient’s eligibility, the program attempted to remove discretionary implementation that 
had plagued previous assistance programs.   
These programs started a global trend of creating programs which have benefits 
based on recipients adhering to certain behavioral conditions. Conditional Cash Transfer 
(CCTs) programs have become some of the largest forms of social assistance; Mexico’s 
                                                 
2
 The evolution of the Bolsa Escola program will be explored in depth in Chapter IV. 
3
  Fiszbein, Schady et al, Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future 
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program has grown from 300,000 to over 5 million households, while the Bolsa Familia 
program has expanded to over 11 million families.5 In practice, CCTs have  been a 
relatively small part of government’s budgets; ranging from .08 percent of GDP for Chile 
up to only 0.50 percent of GDP for Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico.6  
Over the past decade conditional cash transfer programs have been adopted in 
over a dozen countries.7  While the role and design of programs varies in each context, 
generally these programs transfer cash to poor households provided they meet certain 
behavioral criteria. Program’s conditions create financial incentives for people to invest 
in developing their children’s human capital, while also aiming to reduce poverty through 
wealth transfers. They generally target education, health, and malnutrition in youth, 
almost always providing money to parents who send their children to school or have them 
get regular doctors’ visits.  
The specific nature of the program is dictated by the goals of the policymakers in 
the particular country and the scope of the program.  Some programs operate with the 
goal of reducing the gender gap in education, like the Female Secondary School 
Assistance Program in Bangladesh, or address high drop-out rates as in Indonesia 
following the Asian financial crisis.   Some programs provide block grants to 
communities administered by local government or tribal officials; others are administered 
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at the state or federal level, while others, such as Chile’s Solidario program, have families 
setting their own goals in conjunction with social workers. 8 
Indeed, there has been a parallel rise in conditions based social welfare programs 
in developed countries. Programs such as the New Deal in the United Kingdom, the 
Minimum d’Insertion in France, and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) in the United States all provide wealth transfers conditional on the recipients 
exhibiting “desired behavior.”9  In the short run these programs hope to act as a social 
safety net for the most marginalized segments of the population, while also developing 
positive norms around beneficial behavior. Their long term goal is that positive social 
norms will result in individual’s undertaking capital forming behavior without needing to 
be provided capital incentives, freeing up government money for other activities.  
Conditionality is often justified because of the broad social goals the programs serve, 
the long run benefits to the individuals involved, and the fact they make social welfare 
programs more palatable to taxpayers. Taxpayers are more likely to support programs 
which use their money for productive enterprises where they could potentially see a long 
term benefit. Imposing conditions reassures taxpayers that their money is spent well, 
increasing their support for the program. 
Insofar as these programs put conditions on the receipt of this money, they infringe 
on the personal autonomy of the recipients. Individuals involved in these programs are 
not able to exercise their full range economic choices, instead being constrained by a 
paternalistic government that dictates the conditions an investment can be made. If we 
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conclude that an individual is the best judge of what consumption choices will maximize 
their welfare, imposing conditionality could result in sub-optimal welfare levels for 
recipients. Recognizing that government policies reflect the desires of interested parties, 
it is certainly possible that elites would construct conditionality to serve ulterior motives.  
There is vigorous discussion about whether CCTs exist to fulfill a basic right, or if 
they are responding to a need.10  This debate has been particularly rich in Brazil where it 
was argued that basic human rights include economic rights. The constitutional assertion 
which social assistance programs are based on does not include any discussion of 
targeting, stating instead that the transfers are a basic right of citizenship. Despite this 
assertion, political demands often push for increased restrictions on welfare transfers.11  
Intrinsic in the idea of conditionality is the assumption that the government has the right 
to restrict economic choices of its dependents, thereby curbing them of some of their 
economic freedom. If it is the case that welfare transfers are a basic right than this 
restriction is an illegitimate extension of government.  
Recently there has been an increased emphasis on addressing southern 
underdevelopment, and a renewed debate on how best this can be done.  The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in the late 1990’s, affirmed an international 
commitment to addressing the most serious elements of extreme poverty in fifteen 
targeted areas. Recognizing that extreme poverty often prevents people from having the 
energy and time to develop the necessary skills to improve their welfare, the goals 
specifically focused on issues--such as nutrition, potable water, and healthcare-- aimed at 
                                                 
10
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addressing the most egregious elements of extreme poverty. At the same time the goals 
emphasize areas, such as equitable education, which are paramount for creating the 
human capital necessary for economic advancement.  Public private partnerships, 
nongovernmental organization, international agencies, and national governments are all 
working together to build policies and programs capable of addressing these complex and 
interrelated issues.  
While progress on the MDGs has been inconsistent if not slow, their very 
existence seems to imply a partial international consensus on the presence of certain basic 
rights, liberties, and entitlements. Agreements such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the preamble to the MDGs enumerate certain rights posed as 
inalienable. We universally accept that slavery is a moral wrong, that torture is inhumane, 
and that dying of starvation is inherently bad.  This thesis will operate under the 
assumption that certain entitlements, rights and liberties ought to be recognized and are 
the kind that we ought to use in setting policies. This leaves plenty of discussion of what 
obligations are, how far they extend to the underprivileged, and the interaction between 
the rights of the privileged and the underprivileged. Given that many development 
programs attempt to address these rights, understanding their nature has significant 
implications for how we construct policies and implement conditionality.  This thesis will 
draw on the work of several prominent philosophical branches in order to examine the 
values which can underpin redistribution and conditionality.  
Conditionality itself has a rich and complicated history in the development 
context.  International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank impose conditions on developing countries for accepting assistance. While 
13 
 
complex and contextually specific, these conditionality’s often were attached with the 
goal of changing the country’s behavior in order to improve its competitiveness in the 
global market. The effectiveness of these programs is certainly mixed. Often poorly 
constructed mandates, improper implementation, or ulterior motives would disrupt the 
policies effectiveness, sometimes causing more harm than good. In order to fully 
understand if it is desirable to alter individual behavior by using conditions to create 
incentives for socially beneficial outcomes, it is important that one closely examines how 
poorly targeted mandates can de-rail a program’s effectiveness.  
Conditional cash transfers have the potential to help alleviate current poverty 
while also encouraging long run improvements in welfare through human capital 
development. At the same time they raise a number of important theoretical and practical 
questions which must be closely examined before constructing a policy. CCTs are like 
parents offering to pay children for good grades: they essentially consist of a wealth 
transfer from the privileged to the underprivileged provided they perform well. In one 
respect one could understand social transfer programs as the rich fulfilling their 
obligations to the underprivileged by transferring a just portion of their wealth.  It could 
also be argued that because the rich are giving up some of their endowment, they have 
the right to expect a return from the recipients in the form of certain socially desirable 
behaviors. In this case the rich are not necessarily fulfilling an unbridled obligation for 
distributive justice, but instead providing a benefit for which they can make demands.  
Conditions could be justified by the desire to produce positive socially beneficial 
outcomes--such as increasing youth school attendance and decreasing crime--while 
avoiding negative outcomes—such as eternal dependency on transfer income. The 
14 
 
counter to this point is that people are the best judges of determining what would bring 
them the most welfare, and it is paternalistic of the state to impose restrictions on 
people’s freedom of action. However, it is possible that a short term restriction on 
freedom of action may actually result in greater amount of choices in the long run. One of 
the distinct advantages of many CCTs is they tend to expand access and opportunities 
which participants have by increasing their wellbeing and marketable skills. It is quite 
possible there is an intrinsic good to participating in socialized market interactions, and 
participants in properly constructed social welfare programs will, in the long run, receive 
the substantial benefits from engaging in these interactions.  
Recently there has been increased focus on explanations of development which 
move away from macro level indicators such as GDP, focusing instead on the complex 
interrelated factors which determine individual welfare.  One such approach championed 
by Amartya Sen focuses on development as a function of an increase in an individual’s 
wellbeing, measured by range and degree of potential actions an individual could 
achieve.12 This approach allows one to argue that in situations where there is a tradeoff 
between having more people above the poverty line and a lower GDP the former could 
certainly be seen as the preferable option, especially in when the trade-off is significant. 
A well-being metric is better able to capture the interconnected political, social, 
educational, health, and infrastructural elements which play a role in improving people’s 
welfare. One of the potential advantages of CCT programs is that they have the ability to 
simultaneously improve a number of these interrelated elements.  
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Just like IMF and World Bank’s conditionality’s in the 1980s, CCTs aim to 
change the effective norms of the recipient’s behavior in order to affect long run desirable 
outcomes. The long term goal of CCT programs is to have the behavior which is attached 
to the cash incentive become something which is socially valued, liberating the state from 
providing cash inducements. When social norms are properly targeted and appropriate 
behavior effectively communicated this can be a desirable outcome. At the same time 
prevailing social norms can undermine the program’s effectiveness. Successfully 
implementing a CCT program will require careful analysis of norm transference in the 
particular society in order to maximize positive behaviors while minimizing negative 
impacts of prevailing norms.  
Aside from the theoretical issues raised above, conditional cash transfer programs 
raise a plethora of practical considerations for policymakers. They have to define an area 
where a program could be helpful, and determine what goals need to achieved for it to be 
successful. Once goals have been established, they need to design a program capable of 
meeting these goals while minimizing negative impacts. They will need to ensure 
sufficient funding and bureaucratic capacity to properly implement the program, 
monitoring its progress to ensure it is achieving its objective.  
This process takes place against several background considerations. There is a 
worry that public transfers could crowd out private wealth transfers, though generally the 
size of these wealth transfers is not sufficient to promote long run equality. 13 There is 
often a worry that social safety nets will reduce work effort and result in dependency 
from their recipients. CCT programs need to keep this consideration in mind and 
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construct policies with provisions ensuring the recipients remain engaged in the labor 
market. Although CCTs generally aim to address demand side issues, many endeavor to 
strengthen the supply side as well.1415 While there is no one size fits all model for CCTs, 
there are certainly lessons that policymakers can learn from to increase the likelihood of 
their program’s success.  
This thesis examines the philosophical issues and practical implications of CCT 
programs. The normative position of this thesis is that there are certain values which we 
want to enhance, and that these values are often interconnected in terms of their 
associated outcomes. It will argue that conditionality can be a useful tool for securing 
outcomes as well as affecting norms that encourage human dignity. The goal of social 
policy should be to develop policies which can result in securing shared valued outcomes. 
It will argue that the effectiveness of conditionality requires an understanding of the 
relevant norms, entitlements, and their interconnectedness.  To do this it will develop a 
framework which policy analysts can use to evaluate the implications of a CCT program. 
Only with that richer understanding can conditionality be used productively as part of a 
country specific development strategy.  
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Chapter I: The Nuts and Bolts of CCTs 
 
 
Introduction: Program History and Design  
 
Conditional cash transfer programs are social assistance programs that provide 
cash transfers to poor households provided they make certain investments in human 
capital, normally the recipient’s children. They generally target education, health, and 
malnutrition in youth, often providing money to parents who send their children to school 
or have them get regular doctors’ visits—typically both.  Health and nutrition conditions 
require regular checkups and “growth monitoring” for children, mandatory attendance at 
prenatal care for mothers, and mother’s attendance at health related talks. Their education 
provision usually requires regular school attendance, between 80 percent and 85 percent 
of school days, while often requiring some demonstrated level of increased 
performance.16 
In many developing countries, social safety net programs are a crucial part of a 
well-designed development strategy. They aim to manage social risk, increase equity, 
reduce poverty, and provide social protection. Because of the potential long-term benefits 
of positive behavior changes associated with conditionality, CCT programs could be a 
vital part of a country’s development strategy. CCT programs seek to achieve the dual 
goals of accomplishing a minimum consumption level for poor households, while also 
aiming to encourage better investments in the future. By providing a minimum 
consumption floor, CCT programs are able to provide social protection for families, 
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enabling households to better manage risk. They can provide an important avenue for 
governments to foster more inclusive growth, particularly after adopting macro policy 
shifts which would have negative impacts on the underprivileged. 17 
Since 1997 when nationwide CCT programs were adopted by Brazil and Mexico, 
conditional cash transfer programs have increasingly become a staple of developing 
countries social assistance program. As of 2009, nationwide programs targeting health 
and education have been adopted in Brazil (Bolsa Familia), Mexico (Oportunidades), 
Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo), Colombia (Familias en Accion) and Jamaica (Program of 
the Advancement Through Health and Education). In addition to these national programs, 
niche programs targeting a narrow geographic or demographic area have been adopted in 
Chile and Turkey, while Honduras, Kenya and Nicaragua have recently implemented 
small scale pilot programs.  Brazil (Bolsa Escola) and Indonesia (Jaring Pengamanan 
Sosial) have adopted national programs specifically targeting education, while 
Bangladesh (Female Secondary School Assistance Program), Cambodia (Japan Fund for 
Poverty Reduction and Education Sector Support Project), and Yeman (Basic Education 
Development) have adopted regionally targeted programs.18  
The size, scope, target population, and verification mechanism of the above 
programs varies significantly from location to location. Implemented programs range in 
size from 11 million families in Brazil to 215,000 families in Chile, though small pilot 
programs exist which provide benefits to only a few thousand recipients. In large scale 
programs coverage ranges from over 40 percent of the population in Ecuador and 20 
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percent in Brazil and Mexico, to less than one percent in Cambodia. Conditional cash 
transfer programs do not necessarily have to have a large impact on a country’s overall 
budget. The largest CCT programs exist in Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, and these only 
cost about 0.50 percent of the country’s GDP, while the program in Chile accounts for 
only about 0.08 percent of GDP.19 
Despite the wide variation in implementation, there are certain steps that 
policymakers must go through in order to ensure the program is successful. Policymakers 
must determine how much to spend on the CCT program and where this money is 
coming from. Once budgetary decisions have been made officials need to target a 
particular population and issue which needs to be addressed. Properly identified, a CCT 
program can be designed and implemented to address the problem. The first step in this 
process is targeting a population of recipients who can benefit from this program.  Next, 
they need to design benefit levels capable of achieving the program’s objectives and 
develop mechanisms where these benefits can be transferred to the intended recipients.  
Finally, programs need to incorporate mechanisms for moving recipients out of the 
program, and evaluating how successful it has been at achieving its goals. This section 
will briefly examine some of the key elements of CCTs, exploring the options available 
to policymakers and the implications they have on the individual welfare of recipients.  
 
Program Targeting: 
 
  Almost all CCT programs attempt to target their benefits to the poor with the hope 
that it will achieve the greatest impact within a given budget or at least cost. In theory, 
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when resources are effectively distributed to a marginalized target group, they maximize 
the potential returns from the transfer.  This result is particularly true with CCT 
programs, as improvements in human capital associated with conditionality can cause 
greater returns for wealth transfers. Effective targeting depends on minimizing leaks, 
costs associated with program implementation, while maximizing efficiency of the 
targeting by minimizing inclusion and exclusion errors.  
The effectiveness of targeting depends heavily on the information available to 
program administrators. In many countries implementing CCT programs has been a 
major catalyst for gathering demographic information, developing poverty maps, and 
creating household targeting systems.20 Because targeting is such a crucial element for 
the effectiveness of the CCT program, it is important that countries use the most effective 
strategy and construct the best infrastructure for their given situation. There are three 
strategies which have been used for identifying eligible households for transfers: means 
tests, proxy means test, and community assessments. Often, these methods are combined 
with geographic, gender based, or self targeting systems to further refine the category of 
recipient. Each of these different methods has distinct advantages and disadvantages 
which must be weighed depending on the CCTs context and goal.  
Means Tests: 
 
Of the above methods, means tests are generally considered the “gold standard” 
of targeting. They seek to collect as much information as possible on the household’s 
income or wealth, verifying it with exterior sources like tax authorities or welfare 
agencies. When these verifications are not available, records of bills, pay stubs or taxes 
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can be used as a substitute. In many cases social workers also go to a house to 
qualitatively determine a households living condition and make a judgment on eligibility. 
This potentially exposes applicants to the personal bias of the social worker, encouraging 
corruption on the part of social worker and deception from the recipient. This system is 
best implemented in areas where there is sufficient documentation of verifiable income, 
where administrative capacity is high, and where large enough potential benefits justify 
the administrative costs. This method, along with geographic targeting, has been used to 
great success in Brazil as part of the Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Familia, Bolsa Alimentacao, 
and PETI programs.21 
Proxy Means Tests: 
 
Employed in 29 out of 42 active CCT programs, proxy means tests are by far the 
most popular method of household targeting.22 While the particulars vary depending on 
the programs, the structure of proxy means test is generally consistent. First used 
extensively in Chile, proxy means tests use statistical methods to generate a score for 
applicant households generally using data from household surveys. Categories can 
include, but are not limited to: “location and quality of the households dwelling, its 
ownership of durable goods, its demographic structure, and the education and possible 
occupations of its adult members.”23 Systemic variation comes from differences in the 
quality of information and the methods and rigor of statistical analysis. Oftentimes, 
certain elements of the survey are verified by social workers making visits to applicant’s 
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homes. In situations where such external verification is not possible, creative solutions 
have been employed to ensure accuracy. Once a household’s score is calculated it is 
compared against a predetermined cutoff in order to determine program eligibility. Many 
countries, such as Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, and Pakistan, establish proxy means tests 
when first implementing their CCT programs, subsequently updating them as experience 
and better institutions improve their capacity.24 
The advantage of proxy means testing is that it requires less information than 
traditional means testing, and is able to incorporate numerous different objective 
elements into the analysis. At the same time it has its drawbacks. Its administrative costs 
are high, requiring a relatively large technologically knowledgeable staff capable of 
managing large amounts of data. By using a statistical formula to determine eligibility 
this strategy risks significant errors of exclusion or inclusion by emphasizing certain 
variables for determining a household’s welfare. In practice, proxy means testing is 
usually led by a central agency, but much of everyday work is staffed to local 
municipalities. This could have beneficial or negative implications depending on the 
communication between and capacities of federal and municipal agencies. It is best 
applied in countries that high administrative capacities for programs aimed at addressing 
chronic poverty in economically stable situations. In theory, proxy means testing has the 
advantage of being an objective standard against which all potential beneficiaries are able 
to be objectively judged. 25 
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Community Targeting: 
 
Community-based targeting is the third prominent method of household 
identification. It is used along with geographic targeting in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Ecuador, Kenya and Nigeria.26 This method uses a group of community 
leaders, such as community elders, school officials, or parent teacher associations, to 
determine eligibility for a program. This method relies entirely on local information and 
individual circumstances, possibly providing more accurate and less costly information. 
At the same time it can run into problems of local biases--certain less favored community 
members may be deemed ineligible for benefits--risking community disunity. As opposed 
to the previous methods of identifying targets using objective national standards of need, 
community targeting enables local leaders to take community circumstances into account 
when judging welfare eligibility. Applicants are considered in terms of their social value 
and social need in addition to their individual wellbeing. An argument which is often 
advanced by community leaders against centrally targeted distribution is that targeting 
goes against community solidarity and the spirit of self help.27 At the same time, 
providing  too much discretion without adequate conditions or oversight could lead to 
abuses. Because of these considerations, community targeting is particularly useful in 
situations where there is low administrative capacity, high community cohesion, and the 
target population is relatively small. 28 
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Categorical Targeting and Errors: 
 
In addition to the above household identification mechanisms, governments often 
employ categorical mechanisms for refining the target population. Geographic targeting, 
the most popular of these methods, restricts potential candidates to a particular 
geographic area. This is useful for both improving a regions general welfare and 
aggregated human capital stock. Its simplicity is one of the reasons that geographic 
targeting is so popular: it is used in almost two-thirds of all CCT programs. Similarly, 
demographic targeting restricts potential beneficiaries who have certain age or gender 
based qualifications. These restrictions may aim to right certain historical imbalances or 
achieve scale gains by targeting a particularly productive segment of the population. 
Empirically, gender targeting is the most common form of demographic targeting, with 
programs in India, Bangladesh, Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Cambodia using it as a 
criterion.29 All of these targeting mechanisms provide valuable information to the 
country’s government. Many constitute a significant part of the country’s “institutional 
infrastructure,” and are useful for other social programs and government decisions. 30  
While the above methods of targeting aim to limit the population of recipients, 
often targeting errors, and errors of exclusion and inclusion, constrain the potential 
benefits. Errors of inclusion risk providing benefits to recipients who do not qualify for 
the program, potentially resulting in a regressive policy and a less efficient allocation of 
resources. Similarly, many programs suffer from an error of exclusion, not allowing 
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individuals to participate in the program that are eligible for it. Often this happens when 
the program is not fully funded and has to cap the number of recipients below the target 
level. It also often results from insufficient information on household surveys, meaning 
eligible households slip through the cracks. Sometimes social pressure can encourage 
eligible households not to engage in a program because of stigmas attached to 
participating. While leakages can cause inefficiency, they can potentially make the 
program more popular with groups whose support is needed for budget allocations. As a 
result it might be more beneficial for policymakers to include some members of the 
middle class who do not explicitly need transfers.  
Costs:  
 
In addition to the errors of inclusion and exclusion, implementing targeting 
mechanisms have associated costs which must be taken into account when analyzing the 
viability of a particular program. Administrative costs are the costs of gathering 
information to make a decision on potential applicants. The scope of these costs is hard to 
determine, particularly because staff and administrative resources are generally shared 
amongst different departments. Also, while administrative costs may decrease the bottom 
line for the programs, having better programmatic oversight may result in greater 
targeting efficiency. Targeting costs average about 4 percent of total program costs,31 and 
range from 25-75 percent of total administrative costs. Costs per interview range between 
US $3 and US $8 per beneficiary.  Administrative costs aggregate and tend to be higher 
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in the start-up phase of the program. They can be minimized by using the same means 
test infrastructure across different programs.32 
In addition to administrative costs, private costs are an additional factor which 
must be considered before a program is implemented. If they are large enough they could 
discourage an applicant from applying to the program. These costs include having 
insufficient information about the system, having to pay for bus fares, fees, or bribes in 
order to apply, and difficulty in obtaining the proper documentation. Additionally, many 
programs with a workfare provision require recipients to engage in public works in order 
to receive a benefit. This can cause recipients to use their time working for the state 
instead of seeking other productive employment.33  
Social costs can arise when there is negative stigma associated with participating 
in a particular program. Such a stigma might discourage individuals from applying, 
hurting the ability of the CCT program to have economies of scale benefits. 
Unfortunately, stigmatization often goes hand in hand with transparency, as many 
governments publish lists of recipients in order to encourage transparency and fairness. 
To combat stigmatization, governments often develop information campaigns about the 
program’s benefits and justifications, while also encouraging the development of positive 
social norms towards conditional cash transfer programs. One of the advantages of CCT 
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programs is that conditions help combat the public perception that recipients are living 
off the public dole.34 
 Unfortunately programs are not formulated in a vacuum; instead politicians with 
different interests develop the budget and the criterion for receiving benefits. Sources of 
political support can have an impact on determining eligibility criteria, while public 
perception of CCT programs can shape how far politicians are willing to go in providing 
benefits. 35The relative effect of public perception on politicians also depends on how 
responsive the political system is to voter’s desires. These effects could be positive or 
negative; in situations where countries value social justice politicians might receive 
positive support from voters for CCT programs, while a fiscally conservative electorate 
could put pressure against CCT programs. One of the advantages of CCT programs is 
that conditionality provides a justification for politicians by allowing them to say the 
country is receiving a public good from the program. 
Program Design and Implementation: 
   
Once policymakers have determined the best method of targeting a population for 
a program, they must a implement strategy to move participants through the program. 
The first step in this process is to use their chosen targeting mechanism to move from the 
general population to the targeted one. This is dictated by the eligibility criteria of the 
policy choice.  They need to ensure that there is administrative capacity to implement the 
program, that it is transparent and politically feasible, and that its policies coordinate with 
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previous social programs. This ensures both a public perception of fairness and program 
efficiency.36  Once a population has been targeted, self-targeting by eligible people 
determines the take up rate of the program.  In order to minimize errors of exclusion it is 
important that policymakers ensure that potential applicants have accurate information 
about the program and are aware of their eligibility. It is also important that there is an 
open application process which minimizes transaction costs to beneficiaries.  
The eligibility rate determines how many of the applicants are eligible to be 
beneficiaries of the program. This is determined by eligibility established for the 
program.  Depending on the nature of the program the self-targeted applicants may need 
to have their eligibility verified. In many cases applicants have to provide paper 
documentation of their eligibility, while in others intake workers may make home visits. 
Using third parties as an independent verification source has become increasing popular. 
This can come in the form of community panels determining eligibility, or external 
agencies collecting and analyzing data on potential recipients. 
  The long run goal of conditional cash transfer programs is to improve the well-
being of recipients by supplementing their income and accumulating human capital. 
Inherently these programs are designed to be transitory, with beneficiaries eventually 
exiting the program. It is important that policymakers construct appropriate exit criteria, 
while also providing easy access for beneficiaries to re-certify if they want to remain in 
the program.   
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Developing Benefit Levels and Conditionalities:  
 
Once a particular population has been targeted and a means of determining 
eligibility been developed, policymakers need to determine the particular benefit 
structure and distributional mechanism of the CCT program. The benefit levels for the 
programs depend on the programs objectives, the model policy makers have 
implemented, and budgetary, administrative and political constraints the program faces. 
Benefit levels can have flat or variable formulas, with variation depending on contextual 
factors such as age or gender of the family’s members, as well as the family’s geographic 
location or the time of the year.  
Benefit levels for CCT program reflect the dual objectives of supplementing 
income and encouraging human capital accumulation. Conditional cash programs have 
the additional complication of needing oversight of compliance with the program 
conditions.  Often these programs need to be designed in such a way as to encourage 
proper self selection. For example, in workfare programs the benefit level is the wage 
rate, which is set slightly below the average wage rate for unskilled workers in order to 
ensure proper self-selection.37 Only individuals who are unemployed will see workfare as 
a valuable use of their time.  Setting appropriate benefit levels is a constant process as 
overall budget constraints change and the welfare situation of the poor is in flux. While it 
is important to make benefits contextually responsive, it is equally important to safeguard 
recipients from arbitrary changes to their benefits.  
  Benefit structures for CCT programs are generally quite straightforward, normally 
differentiating payments by the number of children in the eligible age range. Only two 
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programs differentiate recipients by poverty level, while a few do so by the age or gender 
of the students. Recognizing the cost associated with costs of obtaining health and 
education services, most condition cash programs give benefits directly proportional to 
the number of students in the recipient household, though some programs cap this 
number. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia programs caps this at $45, while Mexico caps it at 
$153.38 In some programs, such as those in Peru, El Salvador and Panama, flat benefits 
are paid to recipients. Flat benefits are sometimes used in situations where the budget 
cannot cover all the poor, or if it is felt that incentives should be used to learn a new 
behavior, but are not necessary for each subsequent child. 39 
Each of these benefit structure are designed in light of the contextual 
considerations of the country and environment in which they are created. It is important 
that benefit levels and conditions are designed with full knowledge of desired outcomes 
and opportunity costs of a program. This requires a careful understanding of what 
outcomes a program might have and how one might value them. The following Chapter 
will explore the value principles which underscore redistributive and conditional 
programs, with the goal of developing a functional framework that could be used for 
policymakers seeking to implement CCT programs in their country.  
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Chapter II: Valuing Redistribution 
 
Introduction: Valuing as a Framework  
 
The first Chapter explored the different types of CCT programs and the various 
ways of implementing them, but what constitutes a legitimate claim for a conditional 
program has not been examined. To what degree can individuals make legitimate 
demands on the state, and to what extent may the state put conditions on these demands, 
limiting recipient’s economic autonomy? How far do these claims extend? Do the poor 
legitimately demand redistribution only from their own government, or is there a global 
obligation to support distributive justice?   What role does the market play in 
differentiating between these outcomes, and what is the relationship between the state 
and the market? Understanding these issues is necessary for effectively implementing and 
evaluating CCT programs. They are crucial for evaluating the relationship between a 
citizen and the state, and between participants in a market economy.  This section is 
going to examine the different arguments for redistribution, government intervention in 
market relations, and their implications on CCT design and implementation. 
Philosophical debates about economic redistribution and social justice generally 
focus on the extent of property rights and the limits of the legitimate demands that 
individuals can make on their fellow citizens. This thesis is interpreting right in the 
traditional sense, as fundamental normative rules about what is either allowed to people 
without interference (negative rights), or rules which dictate what is owed to people 
(positive rights). Philosophical discussions of redistribution compare the relative weight 
of protections demanded by negative rights with the obligations resulting from positive 
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rights. This has broadly been split into two groups, with different schools of thought 
emphasizing different criteria for determining just distributions.   The first are the 
thinkers who argue that considerations of justice are independent of the outcome. These 
can be differentiated to those in the Lockean and egalitarian traditions, though there are a 
number of different variations of arguments within each school. This paper will focus on 
the neo-Kantian work of Arthur Ripstein, the egalitarian arguments articulated by John 
Rawls, and the strict libertarian position argued by Robert Nozick. Secondly, many 
thinkers argue the outcome of a situation is what should be considered for evaluating 
justice. This thesis will focus on the classic utilitarian position advanced by Bentham and 
Sidgewick. It will also look at attempts to bridge the gaps between these two positions, 
specifically focusing on the substantive freedoms approach advanced by Amartya Sen. 
 This chapter will look at the arguments for and against different variants of 
economic redistribution advanced by the above philosophers.  To do this it will first 
briefly explain their position on rights, redistribution, and social justice.  It will then test 
these arguments with the issues raised by CCT programs. Should there be wealth 
transfers at all? If so, does the fact they are conditional have implications on the nature of 
the transfer? Is conditionality a consideration imposed for the sake of the taxpayers 
whose wealth is redistributed, or is it employed for the long run benefit of transfer 
recipients? Do the different elements of conditional cash programs illustrated in Chapter 
One alter the implications of the wealth transfer, and does the source of the funds, 
domestic or international, change the nature of these concerns? By analyzing the different 
aspects of conditionality we will hopefully be able to gain a better understanding of the 
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benefits and implications of CCT programs, and develop a more robust justification for 
their implementation.  
 
The Lockean Foundation of Political Rights:  
 
Because conditional cash transfer programs redistribute wealth subject to certain 
conditions, they raise fundamental questions about the extent and limitation of property 
rights. The argument John Locke advanced in his Second Treatise of Government is 
fundamental to understanding the foundations of the debate on justice and redistribution. 
The Lockean argument uses the state’s position as a guarantor of rights to justify state 
action in order to enable its citizen to engage in fair market interactions.  John Locke 
argues that the state emerges out of a social contract with the explicit purpose of 
guaranteeing property rights. By restricting the liberties of the majority to steal an 
individual’s property the state ensures his right to use his property as he sees fit. This is a 
private right, as the rights to one’s property remain exclusively his own. This restriction 
is a necessary precondition for safe market interaction; absent it one could not be assured 
that he would not be attacked and have his property stolen.  
Property has a distinct civil condition. It is exclusive in the sense that a citizen is 
entitled to exclude others from using it and is justified in seeking the states help to protect 
this property.40  Public lawgiving, which makes conferring private property rights binding 
on others, requires a united will to enforce.  Because the state is, more or less, assumed to 
generally reflect the democratic will of the citizens, restrictions on individual autonomy 
with the goal of effectively securing fair private interactions are legitimate.   
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Locke’s interpretation of property rights comes with an important caveat. A man, 
by mixing his labor with an object, has the right to exclude it from the common property 
provided that “there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”41  This statement 
implies there are initial preconditions of distribution which must be met before property 
rights can legitimately be enforced and exchange can take place. Redistribution is 
legitimate in the instance where a transfer results in a distribution which violates the 
proviso.  Similarly, Locke would be in favor of attaching conditionalities to these 
redistributions, provided they are designed in such a way that they will increase the 
recipient’s ability to acquire a minimum amount of property.  
Locke’s proviso has become the subject of much interpretation and debate, as 
individuals in the Lockean tradition use the state’s role as a guarantor of private rights 
and its mandate to secure legitimate preconditions for private exchange to justify 
different levels of state intervention. Depending on one’s interpretation of the proviso, the 
scope and level of the intervention can vary greatly. The guarantee of property rights is 
essential for the functioning of any state, and underscores the conditions under which 
legitimate transfers can take place.  
Strict Libertarianism: Robert Nozick 
 
The libertarian interpretation of Locke’s proviso argues for a very narrow scope 
of legitimate state action. Robert Nozick offers one of the more demanding versions of 
libertarianism. His strict reading of Locke argued that the state is only “an organization 
created by private persons for distinctive private purposes,” and thus it should only 
                                                 
41
 Locke, Two Treatise of Government, Ch V, Paragraph, 27 
35 
 
intervene to guarantee conditions for market interactions.42  Individuals maintain an 
absolute right of self ownership. Rights consist of side constraints, prohibitions against 
the violation of other people’s right of self ownership, and are lexically prior to other 
considerations.  
Nozick argues that using state power to redistribute wealth violates the 
prohibition against aggression, by making one person better off at the expense of another.  
His view prohibits violations of side constraints in pursuit of broader goals, and sees 
redistributive taxation being akin to slavery.  The state should only intervene in situations 
where a constraint on the general population’s liberty is justified in order to protect 
individual rights, or in extreme situation of “catastrophic moral horrors.”43 The above 
conditions result in a minimalist state, with the state guaranteeing the baseline conditions 
which allow legitimate transactions to take place, policing transactions in order to ensure 
this requirement is met, but maximizing its citizen’s liberties. Redistribution is only 
justified in order to finance the policing activities of the minimal state in order for it to 
finance general protective services. Citizens may band together privately to address 
issues such as inequality or education. In these situations, conditionality would be 
legitimate, as the wealth could buy the poor’s commitment to improve their children’s 
human capital for the improvement of their long-term prosperity, but these are private 
transactions and are not considerations of the state.44 
Nozick’s view makes entitlement principles the beginning and end of distributive 
justice, provided that the configuration of holding comes from a legitimate transfer of 
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legitimately acquired holdings.--justice should be assessed by the justice of the procedure 
which facilitated it.45  The view is historical and argues against patterned distributions.46  
He argues that if ones procedural rights restrict the legitimate right of others there is a 
principle of rectification. In such situations the violator will be obligated to provide 
rectification equal to the amount which was lost.  
Built into the high priority Nozick places on property rights is an 
acknowledgement that there are certain preconditions which must be met for holdings to 
be just. He upholds the proviso stating “any adequate theory of justice in action will 
contain a proviso similar to the weaker ones we have attributed to Locke.”  Nozick argues 
that if a legitimate transfer will make a third party worse than they would have been in 
the state of nature, then the transfer becomes illegitimate. The legitimate exercise of 
rights is conditional on the proviso being secured, though Nozick believes this 
conditionality is minimal and unlikely in market capitalism.  
While Nozick’s position in regard to conditionality would appear to be relatively 
simple, his embrace of a limited proviso clouds the picture. In one respect Nozick is 
happy to say that there are linkages among improving health and education and broad 
economic growth, but that it is not the business of the state to engage in trying to secure 
those conditionalities because the only way to do it is to violate an individual’s property 
rights.  He will not necessarily deny that empirically conditionality’s are beneficial, or 
even that they are morally attractive--people are better off if they have expanded 
capabilities—but it is no business of the state to do these things. Because property rights 
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are fundamental, there is no political right for redistribution. The state does not possess 
any special rights; it is bound by the requisites of negative rights of fellow citizens.47  
While Nozick’s argument focuses on the priority of negative rights, by accepting 
Locke’s proviso as a pre-condition for legitimizing transfers he allows that some 
considerations of distribution are necessary for transfers. If the baseline appropriation 
which is mandated by the proviso is breached then he loses his property rights.  Because 
the proviso sets conditions on the legitimate exercise of property rights it is possible that 
this could generate a certain kind of effective conditionality in broader politics.   
Developing a program which ensures that no legitimate transaction would 
undermine the conditions of the proviso could actually increase economic efficiency 
while legitimizing all transactions. It is possible that redistribution could be justified if it 
satisfies the pre-conditions of the minimal state. If the state has to provide general 
protective services against the poor from disrupting legitimate transactions, and the 
wealth necessary to provide those services is greater than conditioned redistributions 
which would prevent them, then redistribution could be justified as it would minimize 
wealth transfers.  
One way to parse out Nozick’s position on conditionality is to examine his 
discussion of Rawls’ principle of distributive justice.  Rawls argues against historical 
distribution of natural talents and abilities because they are morally arbitrary and thus 
would not be accepted by individuals in the original position. Nozick argues that the 
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original position is designed for negative reflective evaluation about differences in 
natural holdings.48 His counter argument takes the following form:  
1. People are entitled to their natural assets 
2. If people entitled to X, they are entitled to any Y that flow from X 
3. Peoples holding flow from their natural assets  
4. People entitled to their holdings  
5. If people entitled to something they ought to have it 49  
 
His first premise argues that if people have an asset, and the asset does not violate 
another’s Lockean right to that asset, they are entitled to that asset. In responding to 
Rawls’ argument Nozick makes the point that there is no discussion of how individuals 
have chosen to develop their natural talents, pointing out that Rawls implicit assumption 
is that initial endowments and external factors dictate everything noteworthy about an 
individual’s character. Nozick rejects this notion, arguing instead for a theory which 
venerates an individual’s autonomy and which does not rely on external factors dictating 
individual decision making. 50 
Nozick brings several lessons to the broad discussion of conditionality. He 
articulates a strict libertarian framework through which redistribution is viewed with the 
strictest scrutiny. Despite the extreme position his argument takes, his adherence to the 
proviso demonstrates that there are almost always necessary conditions of distribution 
which need to be met before market forces can operate. Policymakers have to ensure that 
material conditions do not preclude individual autonomy.   
He also raises the question of whether historically illegitimate transactions can 
undermine the legitimacy of current holdings.  He argues that, because of the principle of 
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rectitude, when holdings have been determined by illegitimate transactions, individuals 
are entitled to receive transfers equal to their lost wealth. Thus, programs which seek to 
address historically marginalized groups may legitimize transfers of wealth. This 
argument is broadly made by Pogge, who argues the history of international economy has 
been one of exploitation by colonizers. Inequality in developing countries is the result of 
this history of exploitation, requiring redress from developed countries to developing 
ones.51 Even if we look simply at a domestic context, historic inequality resulting from 
extreme marginalization, like the Native Americans in the United States, could require 
wealth transfers. It is important to note that the principle of rectitude would not allow 
conditions on these transfers, as they are fulfilling an obligation which arose from 
illegitimate takings.  
Political Foundation: Ripstein  
 
In Force and Freedom Arthur Ripstein presents a neo-Kantian argument for 
redistribution based on just preconditions.  Kant argues that taxation and redistribution 
are justified in terms of securing the private rights of its citizens, what Kant terms the 
rightful condition. Though Kant grants the state’s requirement to work for its citizens 
might restrict the scope of its mandate, it can also generate a “duty to support the poor.”52 
This duty comes from the state’s need for “united legislative will.”53  In a reasonably 
democratic society, the state speaks and acts for all, and thus all must be represented.  In 
order for it to derive this power justly its citizens must have the right relation to one 
another and this relation cannot undermine their united will.  
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It is impossible for impoverished people to meet the rightful conditions for just 
interaction.  In Kant’s view, poverty is analogous to slavery in the sense that the slave is 
dependent upon his master and therefore unable to share a united will with him. 
Similarly, extreme poverty is a situation where one citizen is dependent on the 
benevolence of another, or they are excluded from the system entirely. The view argues 
that an optional act of beneficence leaves the recipient dependent and does not recognize 
their entitlement to function independently as a free agent. Instead, it treats it as an option 
of other agents whether to provide them the resources that makes them more independent 
or not. Being in extreme poverty and excluded from the normal system of exchange is the 
extreme form of dependence, because agents are faced with the choice of taking whatever 
terms are given to  them or face extinction.  
For Kant, either situation is unacceptable.  The goal of the state is to secure 
individual freedom which allows him to pursue his own purpose as he sees fit. Relations 
of dependence prevent this from happening. Because extreme poverty precludes a united 
will, it is justified for the state to take action to secure the necessary pre-conditions for a 
united will. Taxation is justified because private dependence is institutional, “it is the 
consequence of the creation of enforceable property rights,” while the well-off have can 
be taxed because they “owe their existence”54 to the state and the property rights it 
guarantees. Ripstein argues that what is often classified as charity properly understood is 
a fundamental entitlement of those who are recipients. If redistributions do not take place 
the conditions of individual freedom cannot be met. The level of redistribution should be 
enough to allow the individual to fulfill his most necessary natural needs: a level of social 
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provision which enables them to have the opportunity to engage equally in a united will. 
This claim follows from the right to not be dependent on others; citizens are entitled to a 
certain basic level of material resources which they can justly demand from their fellow 
citizens.   
Kant’s approach to redistribution reflects his general argument that a person is 
responsible for his own life.55 He argues that a person is entitled to determine what 
purposes they should have, but this is subject to “the requirement that others have the 
same entitlements.”   To fulfill this obligation it is necessary to provide the background 
conditions which enable them to exercise this right: it is necessary to secure the 
individual’s private right to exercise their own choices without public restraints which 
would violate their private freedom. In order to facilitate this, he argues for a doctrine of 
formal equality of opportunity, though the discussion of this is primarily focused on state 
offices and hereditary rules.56 Despite this, Kant’s argument that republicanism is the 
foundation of a state’s legitimacy is crucial for Ripstein’s interpretation of the welfare 
state. For the state to have legitimacy it needs to come from a united legislative will. To 
achieve this, the citizens must have material preconditions which enable him to engage 
on reasonably equitable terms. Further, the state needs to maintain its own material 
conditions, allowing it to provide protection both internally for its citizens, and against 
external threats.57 To do this, it needs a viable economy and robust population. Education 
and healthcare are inputs which can provide long term stability, enabling the state to 
maintain its legitimacy while fulfilling its vital functions.  
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Education is a necessary pre-condition for the rightful conditions.  It enables 
citizens to be part of the united will, while also providing them the means to stand up for 
their rights against both private persons and the state.58  Education also provides some 
protection against poverty and the dependency it creates. Publicly funded education is 
justified because of the crucial role it plays in securing these necessary individual rights.  
The state has an interest in seeing its citizens educated for the public good, and 
consequently can legitimately compel children to go to school with its citizens paying for 
the privilege.  
The above analysis has important implications for the outcomes associated with 
conditional cash transfer systems.  Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant would support 
programs which redistributed wealth with the explicit goal of achieving the material 
preconditions necessary for a just state. Education and healthcare are two programs 
which are of primary importance because having a healthy and educated populace 
enables the state to maintain its material conditions over time, while also enabling 
citizens to engage equitably with their fellows. Education is also crucial for fulfilling the 
rightful conditions associated with the original contract, as an educated population can 
more legitimately enact laws over themselves.59  Ripstein’s argument supports targeted 
redistribution aimed at improving the health and education of a state’s citizens. His 
argument also lends support for associating conditionality with these wealth transfers. If 
the goal of the state is to secure the individual freedom of its citizens it can legitimately 
impose conditionality on wealth transfers as long as their long term outcomes will 
increase human capital levels and help to establish the rightful condition. The argument 
                                                 
58
 Ripstein,  Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, 292 
59
 Ripstein,  Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, 293 
43 
 
recognizes the state’s interest in having healthy and educated citizens, as these are pre-
conditions for its own legitimacy.  
Not only was Kant concerned with governments legitimately representing the will 
of its citizens, he was also focused on citizens being able to participate in governance. 
The role that community members can play in both designing and administering CCTs 
can significantly increase its impact locally while also encouraging civic engagement by 
bureaucrats, technocrats, and recipients.  Local administration enables the community to 
serve both as a local support mechanism and governance structure, while simultaneously 
increasing the program’s efficiency and legitimacy. 
Kant’s argument highlights some of the additional benefits of CCT programs. 
From a government’s perspective programs targeting health care and education are 
necessary for achieving its own legitimacy; conditionality is justified by the need to 
ensure that rightful conditions are met for its citizens. Taxes supporting the redistributive 
program are justly levied on the well-off members of society because they owe their 
wealth to the existence of the exclusive property rights accorded to them by the states. 
The position demonstrates the importance of explicitly defining what benefit levels are 
necessary for achieving a level of basic necessary needs. It also shows the additional 
benefits associated with civic participation.  
The Egalitarian Tradition: Rawls and Distributive Justice 
 
In Theory of Justice Rawls argues that rules governing transfers are not sufficient 
for maintaining a just distribution. Over time transactions will result in the accumulation 
of wealth and political power which undermine the background conditions required for 
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free and fair agreements.60   His argument for a social process view of justice focuses on 
“the basic structure and regulation required to maintain background justice over time for 
all persons equally.”61 Once the background structure is established pure procedural 
justice can function, providing “everyone following publicly recognized rules of 
cooperation, and honoring the claims these rules specify.”62 Rawls believes that 
individuals are free, within the background conditions of justice, to advance their own 
ends how they see fit.63  The following is an account of how the principles of justice 
establish the background conditions for pure procedural justice, and how conditionality 
can be used to achieve the background conditions.  
The first principle protects an individual’s rights and liberties, establishes the 
institutional preconditions for justice, and is considered lexically prior to the second 
principle: the second principle is applied within the background institutions which satisfy 
the first principle.64 The first principle states that “each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others.”65  Liberty is understood in reference to the agents who are free, the 
restrictions from which they are free, and what they are free or not free to do.66 The idea 
of the first principle is that it secures the formal equality of basic liberties: including 
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liberty of thought and conscience, political liberties, rights and liberties covered by the 
rule of law, and liberty of integrity.67  
The liberties defined in the first principle establish the constitutional foundations 
of government.  Rawls argues the priority of basic rights and liberties presumes the 
background economic and social conditions are such that would allow the basic 
institutions to be reasonably democratic. These barriers must not come from a lack of 
economic means, education, or skills. Additionally, when redistribution is done, it is in 
accordance with the difference principle, which incorporates the idea of reciprocity and 
mutual advantage.68 It will be argued that the outcomes associated with conditionality 
establish the preconditions for the exercise of basic rights, as well as facilitating the 
formal equality of opportunity established by the second principle if justice. The rules of 
the background institutions are designed in order to achieve fair social cooperation over 
time, and are necessary to preserve background justice.69  
The second principle of justice establishes the conditions under which social and 
economic inequalities are legitimate.70  The first part of the second principle guarantees 
equality of opportunity, while the second part of the second principle addresses income 
distribution.  This principle applies at the legislative stage, effecting the institutions of 
distributive justice in particular contextual social and economic situations.   He argues 
that economic inequalities are to be arranged so that “they are to be of the greatest benefit 
to the least-advantaged members of society,” in accordance with the difference principle, 
and that “offices and conditions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair 
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equality of opportunity.”  Fair equality of opportunity means that, given a distribution of 
native endowments, talents, and abilities, all individuals have a fair chance to achieve 
public offices and social positions regardless of social class or origin. To secure this 
opportunity may require transfers of wealth for things such as housing or healthcare, as 
well as providing natural endowments and socially productive skills. These 
redistributions are necessary preconditions for establishing justice as fairness. 
Redistribution should be done in accordance with the difference principle.  This 
encourages mutually productive social interaction. Rawls stipulates that an individual in 
the original position would choose to arrange inequalities in this way. Because of the 
difference principle, we should act in accordance with the benefit of the least best off 
person; society should be arranged such that unjust distribution of wealth is redistributed.  
Therefore, the second part of the second principle guarantees that the first will have 
fundamental worth by ensuring a secure supply of wealth and income as well as a fair 
chance to participate.  
The guarantee provided by the second principle is crucial for understanding 
Rawls’ position on redistribution and conditionality.  Rawls recognizes the inherent 
advantage of liberty advanced by equal citizenship is subject to “their capacity to advance 
their ends within the framework the system defines.”71 Equal opportunity essentially acts 
as a conditionality upon exercising a liberty over property. Unjust economic inequality 
needs to be overcome and fair equality of opportunity need to be achieved. 
 We can now turn to an analysis of the Rawlsian position on conditional cash 
transfers. Given the structure of the first and second principles, it is clear that Rawls is 
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supportive of redistributive programs. They are necessary to address inequalities of 
liberty, opportunity, income, and wealth which are not beneficial to all.72 He is 
particularly explicit in his support of transfers which support education: “the difference 
principle would allocate resources in education, say, so as to improve the long term 
expectations of the least favored.”73  Conditionality can be used as a tool to achieve the 
economic and social preconditions for establishing just institutions as well as providing 
the means for achieving fair equality of opportunity.  The government’s role in 
redistribution is unmistakable, as the principle of common interest dictates the relative 
ranking of institutions based on how well they pursue the conditions necessary for 
equality. 74  
In an effectively administered program there will be many potential recipients 
who do not meet the material preconditions to qualify for the transfer.  The individual in 
Rawls’ original position would choose a redistributive program that would ensure they 
receive a fair share of the pie. At the same time it could be argued that if the criterion of 
restrictions on fundamental rights and liberties is such that they maximize rights and 
liberties for others, a short term restriction on the freedom of action could be justified 
because it establishes the preconditions for the exercise of procedural justice.  The 
outcomes which conditionality is tied to, particularly education and health, are necessary 
for establishing the institutional foundations required for the first principle as well 
allowing basic equality of opportunity.  
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While Rawls will support general conditionality, it is likely that different forms of 
conditionality will receive more support than others. His focus on reducing absolute 
inequality would lend itself toward a means test or proxy means test method of 
determining eligibility as these enable objective interpersonal comparisons of different 
members of society, though he would certainly appreciate the contextual input provided 
by community engagement. Government would legitimately be involved in this process, 
and taxes are properly levied with the explicit goal of redistribution. Given the strength of 
his two principles it is unlikely that Rawls would take the interests of the taxpayers into 
account when determining whether wealth transfers were legitimate. Conditionalities 
establish the background conditions for developing institutions in accordance with the 
first principle of justice, as well as providing the means for achieving fair equality of 
opportunity. 
 Rawls’ position raises the question of whether conditionalities are justified or 
not, and whose interest administrators should be seeking to maximize when administering 
a program. If economic rights are inviolable, as was argued by some factions in Brazil, 
than imposing conditionality’s and restricting the potential behavior of recipients would 
actually undermine the very rights the redistribution is seeking to grant. There is a worry 
that people in the original position would not choose a method of redistribution where 
they could potentially be left out. In order to address these concerns, policymakers have 
to carefully think through both the goals of CCT programs and the implications of 
imposing conditionality so as to ensure background conditions are met.  
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Utilitarian Liberalism: 
 
In contrast with the thinkers who argue justice should be considered ex ante 
outcomes, proponents of outcome based approaches evaluate justice based on the 
situation post redistribution. Utilitarian consequentialist thinkers like  Benthem and 
Sidgewick argue the most just outcomes are those which result in the greatest aggregate 
utility. Some modern interpreters use modified versions of utilitarianism to develop 
benchmarked outcomes as a barometer for policy success, while policymakers often 
appeal to utilitarian arguments when justifying a particular policy.  
Classic utilitarianism was developed by Jeremy Benthem in the early 19th century. 
Benthem famously argued for a common sense morality where the outcome which would 
result in the greatest aggregate happiness should dictate: “By the principle of utility I 
mean that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according 
to the tendency which it appears to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose 
interest is in question.”75  For Benthem, happiness is determined by the balance of 
pleasure and pain, and polices should be chosen based on their expected outcome. 76  In a 
social sense utilitarian calculations determine the consequences of an action, look at the 
welfare outcome of the action, and sum these in order to get an aggregate ranking.  
Society is just when its major institutions are arranged to achieve the greatest net 
satisfaction.77  
 The problems associated with a utilitarian approach are well documented. A 
purely utilitarian calculation is willing to sacrifice the good for the sake of the many, 
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justifying actions, such as the public execution of an innocent man in order to scare the 
rest of the population into not committing crimes. Utilitarianism ignores important non-
utility considerations like freedoms, rights, which are only valued in terms of the relative 
utility they produce.78 In general, utilitarianism does not taken into account distributional 
differences within a society, except in how they affect aggregate utility, though recent 
attempts at modernizing utility have focused on the different marginal utility transfer 
recipient receives compared to the decrease in utility from the taxpayer.79 Though 
promising, it is difficult to determine what the marginal utility for each individual is, and 
it does not take into account the non-utility considerations.  Despite these drawbacks, the 
utilitarian approach does make some significant contributions to the discussion of the 
metrics of development. It demonstrates the importance of taking account of the results of 
a social program, and the need to look at people’s well-being in different social 
arrangements.80 
A utilitarian interpretation of conditionality is fairly simple while also being 
profoundly important. Because consequentialist justifications are often made by 
policymakers, answering a utilitarian calculation is an important gauge for how effective 
a position is. The pure utilitarian redistribution would be justified if it created a greater 
level of aggregate happiness. Redistributive programs are extremely likely to result in an 
increase in aggregate utility because it is highly likely the poor will have higher marginal 
utility from receiving the wealth transfer than the rich will have from losing it. Whether 
attaching conditionality’s to programs is justified or not depends on weighing the long 
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term advantages of conditionality with the short term impacts on both taxpayers and 
recipients.  On the one hand conditionality’s limit the choices that recipients have; on the 
other hand taxpayers may be more in favor of redistributive programs with such 
restrictions because they feel their money is being put to good social use. The relative 
preferences of recipients and taxpayers in a particular country affect the calculation of the 
legitimacy of conditionalities.  
Amartya Sen: Capabilities and Freedom 
 
Sen’s account aims to incorporate many of the arguments previously examined into 
an overarching framework, arguing that just development should be considered in terms 
of the actual freedoms it can achieve. Sen seeks to redefine the debate between liberty 
and outcomes in terms are both be accessible and comparable. His account argues that 
development should be considered in terms of the actual freedoms it can achieve.  He 
argues that freedom has an intrinsic and instrumental value. It is intrinsic because it can 
be understood as an end in and of itself; any action that increases the freedom of an 
individual agent is a good action and progressive for development. Sen makes this 
argument with the claim that “political liberty and civil freedom are directly important on 
their own, and do not have to be justified indirectly in terms of their effect on the 
economy.”81   Freedom also has the value of increasing a person’s ability to achieve other 
important outcomes, its instrumental value.  By increasing an agent’s freedom, one 
increases the realm of possible actions or “capabilities” that the agent has. 
Sen divides his freedoms in to five categories.  political freedoms, consisting of 
civil and political rights which enable individuals to participate in and criticize 
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government; economic freedoms, referring to an agent’s ability to engage in and 
participate in economic markets using resources available, and referring to distributional 
positions; social opportunities, opportunities provided by society for things that enable a 
person to live a full life, for instance education and healthcare; transparency guarantee, 
the assurance that agreements made under the system or by society will be honored; and 
protective security,  the trust that societies members will not be reduced to abject poverty 
and misery.82 Each of the freedoms defined in these categories is necessary for a 
complete understanding of development. They work to mutually augment the 
effectiveness of each other. 
Sen’s capabilities approach argues that development consists of maximizing the 
substantive freedoms members of a society have reason to value. He argues these 
relations can be measured by functioning and capabilities. Functionings are “the various 
things a person may value doing or being,” while capabilities are “alternative 
combinations of functioning that are feasible for her to achieve.83” The distinction 
between these two is very important. While functions refer to a person’s actual 
achievements, capabilities refer to the functioning combinations which a person can 
choose.84 This implies there is an intrinsic value in having the freedom to choose the 
course of one’s actions rather than having value lie solely in the most preferred element 
in a choice set. It also is a more realistic definition because it takes into account the 
circumstances a choice was made in. The nature of an action taken by a rich person 
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necessarily refers to the alternative choices he could have made. Functioning’s and 
capabilities provide the basis for a holistic conception of evaluation.  
Sen’s work is particularly important for an analysis of a conditional redistribution 
system. By framing questions of development in terms of functioning’s and capabilities 
he allows effective comparisons of the various ways that redistributive programs and 
conditionalities can affect the different elements of individual and social well-being. For 
Sen conditionalities are often a justifiable element of a wealth transfer program, as they 
provide a way to balance short term interests of economic freedom, with long term values 
of social inclusion, political freedom, market inclusion, and long run economic freedom. 
This framework will be particularly valuable when analyzing the different elements of 
conditionality and redistributive frameworks.  
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Chapter III: Public Attitudes and Programmatic goals 
  
"Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of 
philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the 
problems of men."--John Dewey 
 
Introduction:  
 
The discipline of philosophy is often criticized for dealing with abstract questions 
that do not seem to have any relevance for everyday lives. While this criticism might be 
true in some cases, it is not universal. In asking fundamental questions about any 
position, philosophy allows us to explore the forces and underlying justifications that 
drive a position, stripping it of its contextual trappings.  When used in policy analysis it 
allows us to identify the theoretical framework around which a particular position is 
constructed.  By analyzing policies this way we can gain a better understanding of the 
nature of government programs, and the decision-making process which guides them.  
This Chapter explores how social values are developed and transferred, and how 
they can affect policymakers in order to achieve valuable outcomes. It then examines 
potential designs of redistributive programs, exploring how their particularities can result 
in valued outcomes. This thesis argues that since so many people have such a skewed 
income position in developing countries, conditional cash transfers, if done efficiently, 
effectively, and fairly, are a good thing. It adopts the normative position that the goal of 
redistributive programs is to improve human dignity by striving for the shaping and 
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sharing of valued outcomes. In order to do this it analyzes the potential outcomes from 
redistributive programs, evaluating their implications for value systems.  
 
Norms, Social Values, and Political Decision Making:  
Political decision-making takes place within the context of a particular social 
value structure governed by social norms. A program’s ability to encourage a broad 
sharing of valued outcomes is partially determined by the barriers erected by social 
norms. Certain shared values enable us to communicate and understand each other 
effectively. Norms facilitate interaction while also constraining undesirable behavior, 
meaning they can play both a proactive and protective role. Positive social norms can 
increase individual wellbeing. For example, encouraging mothers to take their children 
for regular checkups increases the likelihood that attending health clinics becomes a 
generally practiced behavior. At the same time norms can have pernicious effects. 
Negative stereotypes can cause different elements of society to be marginalized, while 
improper expectations for future opportunities can cause people to make poor short term 
investments.  
  Just as norms can facilitate social behavior they can also limit human autonomy 
and well-being by restricting the way one thinks or by making a preference socially 
unacceptable. Norms can create a division between the judgments and desires which are 
displayed in public and those which are privately held.85   Often norms are disliked by 
individuals but are adhered to because of general social pressure. In certain cases, 
reactions against prevailing conditions results in segmentation of ideology within the 
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individual.  Norms are often extremely specific to one’s social role, and are frequently 
internalized rapidly by that particular actor.  Social roles and expectations can act also as 
a constraint on one’s behavior. One of the goals of conditionalities is the hope that they 
can result in the adoption of positive social behaviors. Thus, it is important that the 
manner in which these conditions are imposed encourages this adoption rather than 
causing resentment. 
Norms can be identified in specific norm communities: social groups that share 
similar values and beliefs. Occasionally, these communities develop their own 
independent norms against the prevailing opinion.  These communities also partially act 
as a constraint on behavior, as the benefits they provide and punishments they exact 
makes exiting them a costly proposition. Government initiated action can also result in 
long-term norm shifts. They can do this by exploiting certain entrenched attitudes and 
opinions in order to cause behavioral changes, or by adopting programs which strongly 
convey a social value. They can also use financial resources and conditions to change the 
perceived value of certain members of society.  Norm cascades are successful when 
prevailing opinion reaches a tipping point, where the adherence to the old norm is met 
with disapproval while the new norm is met with approval.  
Norms, norm shifts, and norm communication are extremely important 
considerations for policy makers, especially when structuring social transfer programs. 
From a purely political standpoint, norms affect the voting decisions of the populace by 
defining the values by which they evaluate policies. If politicians wish to remain in 
power they need to pay careful attention to the values of their populace or face defeat at 
the next election. At the same time, social acceptance of a program is extremely 
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important for its development.  If people perceive the value of a particular policy they 
will work to achieve its goals, but if they do not believe in them popular opinion can 
quell progressive advancement. Policymakers need to develop programs within the 
confines of prevailing political conditions, while at the same time engendering positive 
change.  Understanding the public’s attitude facilitates the policymaker’s ability to frame, 
assess, design, and implement particular social assistance policies.86  
The above sections show that norms and values are transferred in ways that can 
result in desired outcomes.  Redistributive programs communicate societal respect for 
broad values, with the possible result of changing the associated social norm.  For 
example, by implementing a program that guarantees a basic minimum income, the 
government signals the society’s values of affection towards the less fortunate. Specific 
program design can shape the values of the recipients. Education is a good example of 
how this works. The school can be a means through which the value of education is 
transferred: children who go to school are explicitly taught to value an education and the 
increased prospects that come with it. In the long run this process can increase the 
perceived value of education and healthcare. Conditionality may be one way of 
augmenting the norms associated with these values; it is important that policymakers 
explore programmatic designs which incorporate effective norm entrepreneurs and that 
can communicate broad social values. Incorporating community input in program design 
and targeting could be one way of creating a shared norm framework.  
 
                                                 
86
 Graham, Public Attitudes Matter: A Conceptual Frame for Accounting for Political 
Economy in Safety Nets and Social Assistance Policies, 2 
58 
 
Public Attitudes and Policy Formation:  
 
Prevailing norms affect social perceptions and have practical implications for 
policy creation. They influence which designs and which outcomes can be practically 
implemented, and inform policymakers on how to best structure a program.  Much recent 
scholarship has focused on the interaction between the public’s attitude and its nation’s 
redistributive. Work by Shapiro and Spade found that for over a forty-year period, 
changes in the public’s attitude generally preceded policy changes. (CITE)  Other work 
has compared differences in attitudes towards redistribution and policy outcomes in 
Europe and America.  Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP for the US was 
29.9, with only 10.6 percent of these funds going to social transfers, and 0.4 going to 
subsidies. Conversely, continental Europe had an average expenditure of 44.9 percent of 
GDP, with 17.6 percent of these revenues going to transfer programs and 1.5 percent 
going to subsidies. In terms of purely redistributive programs, social transfers and 
subsidies, the United States spends approximately half of what continental Europe does.87  
 Americans’ and Europeans’ beliefs about social mobility and the causes of 
poverty accord with the difference in social expenditure. 71 percent of Americans believe 
that the poor have good chance of escaping poverty while only 40 percent of Europeans 
share this conviction. 61 percent of Americans believe individuals are poor because they 
are lazy.88 In conjunction with this statistic, a higher percentage of Americans believe 
that an individual’s economic position is determined by effort, while Europeans assert 
that luck - the position or skills one is born with-plays a much larger role. The perception 
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of greater American social mobility is not backed up by the evidence, as the United 
States’ has only exhibited marginally more mobility from middle to upper middle class, 
and substantially less from the lower to middle class. Despite this evidence, the 
prevailing belief that American society is mobile often results in less support for 
redistribution because those below the average income line believe they will be above it 
someday. 
  The above results illustrate the powerful influence that public perceptions can 
have on policy making. Numerous explanations have been given explaining this 
relationship.  Alesina and Glaser argue that institutional structure and racial differences 
are the cause of different levels of redistribution.  Piketty posits that past mobility 
influences political attitudes towards future mobility, work that is supported by Corneo 
and Gruner.89 Their analysis showed that “social rivalry effects” and “public values” 
effects shape opinions regarding distribution, the former being perceptions of how they 
view themselves relative to their neighbors, and the latter being perceptions about how 
fair opportunities are distributed in society.90  Peter Lindert showed that the size of the 
gap between the middle and the poor affects social spending, as the middle class feels 
less affinity with the lower class. These studies demonstrate the public’s opinion about 
social mobility, redistribution, and social justice, has important implications for 
redistributive policies in particular countries. Safety net programs are often a balancing 
act between entrenched attitudes of the citizenry and the reform desires of politicians and 
international actors. It is crucial that policymakers frame programs in such a way as to 
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use existing values to achieve positive outcomes, while encouraging the adoption of 
positive norms. 
  One result which follows from the analysis above is that avenues which 
communicate social values to policymakers are crucial for encouraging the transfer of 
positive social values. Elections can play a critical role in this process as they are an 
important avenue for expressing social attitudes and influencing the development of 
policy. Democratic processes are one important mechanism for ensuring that 
governments are accountable to their constituencies. In terms of demand-driven 
development programs like CCTs, a responsive local political climate is particularly 
important for program success. When citizens perceive an electoral environment is fair 
and representative they are more likely to participate in the implementation of the 
projects that the political system implements, even if they are initiated at a different level 
of government. Non-competitive environments also impact elite behavior in a negative 
way, leading to increased opportunities for corruption among the party. 
 The effects of elections are particularly pronounced in decentralized situations 
where citizens feel a direct relationship with their politicians. Research done on the 
implementation of PRONASOL in Mexico demonstrated that a demand-based approach 
was particularly effective in a democratic political environment. Research done by 
Hicksey found that more beneficial outcomes came from implementing demand based 
programs in contested political environments.91  Similar results were found when 
examining redistributive programs in Brazil.  These examples demonstrate the critical 
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role that local municipalities play in successfully implementing demand-based programs. 
This discussion is particularly important for CCT programs. Incorporating the local 
government can engender a feeling of responsibility for a policy, increasing the 
likelihood that values will be transferred and the desired outcome achieved.  
Evaluating Outcomes of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs:  
 
The normative position of this thesis is that there are certain values we want to 
enhance, and that these values are often interconnected in terms of their associated 
outcomes. The goal of social policy should be to develop policies that can result in 
securing shared valued outcomes. Conditionality can be a useful tool for securing 
outcomes as well as affecting norms that encourage human dignity. It is particularly 
effective when used to promote outcomes whose interrelated elements establish the 
necessary preconditions for the enhancement of other outcomes.  For example, one 
requirement for political freedom is the ability to understand and engage in the political 
process. Thus, promoting education can establish the preconditions for political 
engagement.  
At the same time it is important for policymakers to recognize that the prevailing 
social environment has a direct effect on a program’s ability to achieve its desired 
outcome: prevailing social norms can inhibit or undermine the effectiveness of 
redistributive programs, while positive affection can increase the likelihood of its 
success. Policymakers need to design conditionalities so they can draw on certain 
positive norms, or erode certain norms that present obstacles.  
In order to examine the implications of conditionality and redistributive policies it 
is necessary to look at the particular outcomes that could result from these programs. 
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While a number of frameworks could be used to differentiate these outcomes, this thesis 
will draw from the work of Harold Lasswell.   In Jurisprudence for a Free Society 
Laswell enumerates an 8-value framework which allows one to evaluate how particular 
the outcomes of a transfer program affects human dignity.  
These are:  
 
1. Well-being: the right to life, liberty, rest and leisure, and general social security  
2. Skill: the right to work and to have free choice of employment as well as protection 
from unemployment 
3. Wealth: recognizing the right to own property, live in a standard living adequate for 
well-being, and access to enough nutrition 
4. Enlightenment: people have the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to 
seek and impart information and ideas  
5. Respect: that people are born free and equal in dignity and right 
6. Power: the right to take part in government and be recognized as a person before the 
law   
7. Affection: the right to marry and to establish a family 
8. Rectitude: freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Duties to the community and 
restraints on having these freedoms destroyed by others.92  
 
Lasswelll argues that by shaping and sharing the above values society can improve 
human dignity. Shaping and sharing of valued outcomes means that all citizens ought to 
participate in determining what outcomes society should be generating, that valued 
outcomes ought to be expanded, and that these outcomes ought to be shared broadly, 
implying a wide participation.  As Lasswell and McDougal point out: 
 
“…sharing values carries two sets of meaning, one ‘distributive’ and the other 
formative. ‘Distributive’ values reference the participation in the control of value 
outcome, described according to the degree of equality or inequality. ‘Sharing’ 
carries two sets of meaning, one ‘distributive,’ the other ‘formative.’  The 
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distributive reference is to participation in the control of value outcomes, 
described according to the degree of equality or inequality. The formative 
meaning suggest that the amount of a given value available for sharing may be 
augmented.  In general we are in favor of higher levels of valued outcomes, 
because we are ‘concerned about the size of the cake as well as the proportional 
size of the slices.’”93   
 
This normative position argues that, ceteris paribus, an expanding economy is an 
appropriate element for a welfare program in its pursuit of human dignity. Achieving 
valuable outcomes informs us that a policy was righteous and done justly: it was in 
accordance with values that are substantial, meaningful, and representative. If the goal of 
cash transfer systems is to promote human dignity one must examine the potential 
outcomes which might result from a conditional cash transfer system, and explore how 
we might value them in light of the questions raised by conditionality.  
Considering valued outcomes is important for policymakers because different 
programmatic designs will result in different outcomes.  If this normative position is 
embraced by government officials entrusted with deciding whether CCT programs should 
be adopted in a specific context, and how they should be designed, then policymakers 
need to determine what potential outcomes there are, and determine which ones are 
valuable. 
• For each of the potential outcomes that cash transfers might provide, are these 
outcomes relevant in that context, and are they outcomes desired by the officials? 
o The complete list of potential outcomes is: 
 
 Improve the well-being of the poor 
 Increase unrestricted consumption choices 
 Make the poor more effective citizens 
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 Increase the poor’s participation in the market  
 Allow access to basic minimum economic benefits 
 Decrease material inequality 
 Fulfilling society’s obligations to share material welfare to all of its 
people  
 Take wealth from one group and give it to another  
 Disengagement by upper class elements from the social process 
 
• For each of the potential outcomes that conditional cash transfers might provide, are 
these outcomes relevant in that context, and are they desired by the officials?  
o The complete list of potential outcomes and their associated welfare value is: 
 Well-being 
• Improve the well-being of the poor 
• Increase consumption choices subject to restriction 
• Decrease material inequality 
• Create disincentives for child labor 
• Create incentives for school 
• Promote childhood health and nutrition 
• Increase the aggregate happiness of a society  
 Rectitude 
• Provide incentives for socially desirable behavior 
• Allow the interests of taxpayers to dictate consumption choices  
• Fulfilling society’s obligations to share material welfare to all 
of its people  
• Protecting the children’s well-being against selfish parents 
 Power 
• Making the poor more effective citizens 
• Encourage democratic participation  
• Encourage participation in government  
• Improving the health of mothers and infants 
 
 Skill:  
• Promote the development of job skills  
• Increase the poor’s participation in the market  
• Improve labor mobility  
• Create incentives for school attendance 
 
 Respect 
• Target certain demographic groups 
• Fulfilling society’s obligations to share material welfare to all 
of its people  
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• Take wealth from one group and give it to another 
 Affection:  
• Encourage participation in government  
• Improve care of children 
• Encourage community involvement  
• Improve social institutions 
 Enlightenment:  
• Create incentives for school attendance 
• Provide the pre-conditions democratic participation in 
government  
• Improve early childhood nutrition and education 
 
The above lists show the potential outcomes that can result from both cash transfer and 
conditional cash transfer systems. For any policymaker considering implementing one of 
these programs it is important to evaluate how much they value each of these outcomes, 
as well as how effective the program will be.  One of the advantages of imposing 
conditionality is that it can result in valued outcomes that are preconditions for achieving 
other valued outcomes.  
The capacity to implement these positions is subject to the contextual factors in a 
country: its political stability, bureaucratic and institutional framework, and its technical 
capacity, as well as the current social and economic situation. Because of the long 
reaching implications of CCT policies it is important to emphasize programs which use 
existing positive norms in order to increase the likelihood outcomes will be adopted, or 
design policies in such a way that norm and value shifts can positively alter the social 
value framework. 
Outcomes of redistributive program are not a zero-sum game. Limited budgets 
inherently restrict different programmatic designs and force a tradeoff between different 
valued outcomes. Similarly, some outcomes might result in an increase in one value at 
the expense of another. For example, maximizing wealth in a country might come at the 
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cost of affection: citizens spend more time at work earning income rather than being at 
home with their families. While the specific values in a particular situation are always 
contextual, philosophical positions and historical examples are useful guides for 
examining values. Philosophy allows us to explore the values and underlying 
justifications that drive a position. They enable us to question when the state is 
legitimately exercising its authority in securing rights and liberties in accordance with 
democratic processes. When used in policy analysis it allows us to identify the theoretical 
framework around which a particular position is constructed.  By analyzing policies this 
way we can gain a better understanding of the nature of programs and the tradeoffs 
associated with them, while also allowing us explore how we might value the relative 
trade-off.   
To illustrate how a policymaker might value programmatic outcomes this thesis 
will now analyze the key structures and designs of CCT programs, examining the value 
questions they raise. These elements will be evaluated using arguments advanced in 
Chapter Two as well as historical debates. Evaluating programs this way allows policy 
makers to understand the degree to which a CCT program will accord with the values 
already prevalent in a society, enabling them to either design programs which will have 
more legitimacy or be constructed with the goal transforming the prevailing norms so 
they align with valued outcomes. This thesis specifically focuses on the following 
questions:  
• should there be redistribution?  
• how tightly should transfers be targeted? 
• should they be conditional in general? 
• should we use conditionality to support health outcomes? 
• should we use conditionality to support education outcomes? 
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• who should decide the criteria for redistribution: community vs. 
government? 
 
Many of the outcomes come directly or indirectly from certain elements of CCTs, with 
different structural elements resulting in an increase or decrease of a particular outcome. 
It will explore these elements of CCT systems, and examine the values of their outcomes.  
Redistribution:   
 
Whether there should be redistribution, to whom, and how much is at the heart 
social policy creation. Redistribution asks what right all citizens have to the wealth 
produced within a nation, and to what degree are rights reserved to individuals. It also 
raises the question of how responsible the state is for providing social protection to its 
citizens, particularly if this debt constitutes an obligation that needs to be fulfilled.  If the 
goal of normative policymaking is to improve human dignity the state will have to seek 
to improve individual and social welfare subject to social value considerations. The 
normative justification and ability to implement these positions is necessarily depends on 
the contextual factors in a county. This section is going to deal with three fundamental 
elements of redistribution: should there be redistribution, should there be cash transfers, 
and should there be conditional cash transfers? Each of these typologies raise questions 
about different value structures, and have different advantages. 
It is important to have a deep understanding of the justifications for the policy as 
well as the flexibility to improve its mechanisms in order to get better long term results. 
In Chapter Two we explored numerous ways of framing and justifying redistributive 
frameworks. Rawls saw a guarantee of a basic minimum income as precondition for the 
exercise of liberty. It is the primary job of the state to minimize inequalities and to 
allocate resources so as to improve the lives of the worse-off. Similarly, Ripstein and Sen 
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argued that basic minimum welfare was required for citizens to effectively participate in 
a society. For Ripstein, basic minimum income was a necessary precondition for 
possessing a united will. Sen provides a method of measuring the different value 
outcomes that result from implementing a redistributive program in terms of the different 
vectors of freedom it opens up for its recipients. He points out that a basic level of 
income is necessary for exercising economic, social, and political freedoms. In general 
efficient redistributive policies improve the well-being and wealth of the least off, while 
also potentially increasing affection and skills by making individuals less dependent on 
employer decisions and improving labor mobility.  
Considerations of the above positions need to be balanced with worries that 
redistributive policies create. Redistribution decreases wealth for a substantial segment of 
the population without compensation. It alters the basic property rights of the country, 
making them contingent on a certain provisions of social welfare and patterned 
distributions.  Nozick argues these takings illegitimately impinge on an individual’s 
freedom. If the taxpayers are having their money used for social welfare policies they 
should have some stake in the program; they would want to see that the program leads to 
long run social or economic gains. In outcome terms, it could actually decrease aggregate 
economic output by putting money in less efficient parts of the economy, and could 
provide disincentives to work for both the well-off and impoverished.  Redistributive 
policies could create a situation where one social group is dependent on another social 
group. If implemented poorly these programs could create disaffection between different 
social groups, increasing the likelihood that there will be shirking and inefficiencies. 
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 One of the implicit goals of redistributive programs is to improve democratic 
participation.  Conversely, Rawls holds there is an intrinsic value to self-government that 
stems not from a desire for power, but comes from having “an equal voice along with 
others in settling how basic social conditions are to be arranged.” The effect of these 
values enhances the self-esteem of the citizen, and “raises his awareness of his own worth 
developed in the smaller association of his community and is confirmed in the 
constitution of the whole society” 94 Voting and holding political opinions  is an activity 
that informs his conception of the broader society, encouraging the development of his 
intellectual capacities.  
 
Targeting:  
 
Targeting wealth transfers to certain populations is, at the same time, the most 
logical and difficult element of a redistributive program.  It incorporates a targeted 
population and a targeting mechanism. The implicit logic behind targeting is that we get 
more bang for our buck for targeted transfers: individuals who are in most need of a 
transfer are the ones who should actually receive it. This is often grounded in the idea 
that a certain minimum level of welfare is a necessary precondition for individuals to be 
fully-fledged members of society. This notion is an explicit part of Rawls’, Ripstein’s, 
and Sen’s arguments. For Sen, targeting is a particularly important issue.  The extent of 
targeting has to proceed directly from an analysis of the person’s capability deprivation 
determined by examining their current functioning’s. Targeting needs to take these 
holistic elements into consideration. Even Nozick notes that redistribution is necessary if 
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the result of the social system would make the poorest worse off than they would have 
been in the state of nature. In some respects Nozick actually takes it a step further, 
arguing that targeted redistribution could be used to right past instances where unjust 
deals were made. By explicitly defining a particular population and reason for 
redistributive justice targeting gets to the heart of social welfare programs.  
Targeting raises a host of issues regarding value outcomes. Because it 
differentiates people into the deserving and the undeserving it inherently raises questions 
about social segmentation and differentiation. Why should one group get a transfer over 
another, and can this differentiation be justified in accordance with the prevailing or 
desired social values? Groups could be targeted because they have been historically or 
geographically marginalized, like Black South Africans in the BEE program, because 
they are likely to be more efficient with the resources provided. This often is the 
justification for giving wealth transfers to women, particularly in Bangladesh and India 
For policymakers these questions are particularly salient, as targeting can easily cause 
discord among their constituency, decreasing affection as well as efficiency. Individuals 
who are not a part of a program may feel less inclined to support it. As a result it might 
be more beneficial for policymakers to include some members of the middle class who do 
not explicitly need transfers. These leakages could engender support for the programs at 
the expense of decreasing its results.  
There is significant evidence that self targeting increases efficiency. Because 
individuals take into account their holistic status rather than simply income 
characteristics, programs which employ this method get outcomes which take more 
holistic concerns into consideration. In Development as Freedom, Sen details several of 
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the associated problems with targeting.   Information distortion occurs with programs that 
attempt to determine eligibility. There is a risk of including the non-needy and excluding 
some of the needy. As enumerated above, leakages could also have some potential 
benefits by increasing the total number of people who are invested in a program. In many 
contexts the notion that money is going to people who need it is a primary reason that 
taxpayers redistributive programs. Poor targeting could erode the social value of 
affection, decrease the efficacy of cash transfer programs, and possibly hurt the overall 
redistribution agenda.   
In addition to the above problems, poor targeting can result in incentive distortion, 
the prospect of losing the benefit of a transfer could encourage people to change their 
economic behavior in order to keep their benefits. Explicitly targeting certain groups 
could result in transfer disutility and stigma: a system which identifies an individual as 
poor risks marginalizing a recipient. This can either lead to a loss of self respect or a 
decreased likelihood they will participate in the program.  Administrative costs consist of 
the money used in targeting and the potential social costs of asymmetrical power of the 
bureaucracy, increasing the costs of corruption. Often the recipients of programs are from 
marginalized political groups. As such there is a risk that political will could turn against 
transfer programs, cutting them loose from the social safety net.95 It is important that 
programs create a feeling of shared values across the political spectrum. For programs to 
have social legitimacy they need to effectively minimize the negative costs associated 
with targeting while carefully analyzing its contextual implications.  
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While determining desired values is a necessary precursor for any redistributive 
program, choosing an appropriate targeting mechanism is essential for efficiently 
achieving effective results while minimizing distortions. Different targeting methods 
have different implications for the value structure of a welfare program. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the primary methods of targeting are means testing, proxy means testing, 
geographic targeting, and community targeting. If there is a social consensus on the 
material pre-conditions necessary for social participation, mechanisms such as the means 
test and the proxy means test could be recognized as the best ways of choosing 
redistributive programs. Policymakers can incorporate shared value systems into 
determining eligibility criteria; these methods are often seen as the most objective, and 
are often desired if impartiality is a value of the populace.  
Geographic targeting can increase affection as well as labor mobility in situations 
where asymmetrical growth or historic marginalization has hurt development and 
inclusion. This form of targeting is particularly salient in countries with stark rural-urban 
divides, where often the rural population has little or no say in governance, and very little 
chance of participating in the development of the society.96 By increasing the well-being 
of individuals on the geographic periphery of a society it can create a broader range of 
labor and social mobility. The linkages associated with geographic targeting are 
particularly striking. As entire regions of the country can be incorporated into the social 
value structure, economies of scale for aggregating political, social, and economic may 
be significantly increased. Sen makes the case for education as a public good: “Given the 
shared communal benefits of basic education, which may transcend the gains of the 
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person being educated, basic education may have a public-good component as well.”97  
This public good element is augmented by geographic targeting. Moving transfers to a 
previously marginalized region may increase the overall economic situation, encouraging 
employers to bring businesses to the area, and helping to develop local political 
institutions. 
Community targeting is in many ways the most philosophically interesting 
element of cash transfer programs. While one of the goals of CCTs is to engender a 
feeling of belonging to the broader national community, local targeting can engender the 
creation of communal values by also capitalizing on local knowledge bases to improve 
outcomes. Communities can be incorporated in developing benefit levels, targeting 
transferees, and evaluating programs. The effectiveness of community targeting depends 
on a host of contextual factors, such as the local political structure, the culture’s beliefs 
regarding social security, the size, scope, and capacities of the municipality etc. 
Effectively employing community transfers in the right context can take advantages of 
these different factors in order to make the program more effective. This can increase the 
community’s mutual respect in conjunction with improving wealth, rectitude and 
affection, increasing the likelihood the program will be successful.   
Conditionality:  
 
Conditional cash transfer programs redistribute of wealth to impoverished 
members of society subject to the fulfillment of certain behavioral conditions. In general 
these conditions are designed to improve the long-term well-being of recipients by 
encouraging human capital development in their children. Transfers are often contingent 
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on children enrolling and attending school, as well as being inoculated and having regular 
checkups at health clinics. The cash transfer component seeks to alleviate the most 
immediate and pressing concerns of poverty, while the conditions imposed seek to alter 
the structural foundations of systemic poverty.98 These goods are deemed to be socially 
valuable. Conditions are necessary because policymakers see that there is an 
underinvestment in education and health by the poor. Because they do not value these 
inputs as highly as they should the poor need an incentive attached to encourage the 
consumption of a “merit good.”99    
Conditioning rights on certain behaviors is an intrinsic element of any society. 
Laws put down a host of conditions on certain behaviors.  The right to drive in 
conditioned on driving on the right side of the road, a restriction we all agree is 
legitimate.  While there is nothing inherently problematic about conditionality, there are 
situations where unjustifiable conditions can be placed on individuals or groups that have 
the effect of undermining autonomy and compromising human dignity.The goal of this 
section is to explore what it is that makes a conditionality justified, and when 
policymakers are justified in using it as part of a redistributive program.  
The implications of imposing conditions on wealth transfers depend on the social 
values which underscore redistributive systems and how conditions are implemented.  
For example, in Brazil it was argued that achieving a basic minimum income was an 
intrinsic right of all citizens. Conditions were imposed as a function of achieving that 
condition, not as a means to coercively produce socially desirable behavior. In practical 
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terms this meant that often administrators would not strictly enforce the terms of 
conditionality. In fact non-compliance was regularly seen as a signal of a family needing 
additional assistance, often resulting in social workers intervening directly to help the 
family.100  This understanding accords with the argument which Rawls advances in A 
Theory of Justice. He argues that having at least the minimum amount of primary goods 
is a precondition for having fair equality of opportunity. These preconditions include 
numerous linkages of background conditions--adequate housing, minimum level of 
incomes, sufficient well-being etc.--of which education and adequate healthcare are but 
only two elements of a larger puzzle. Thus imposing conditionality’s with the goal of 
achieving the preconditions for fair equality of opportunity is a legitimate goal of 
redistributive programs.  
Conditionality is a conduit both for expressing and shaping normative values as 
well as a mechanism for achieving socially desirable outcomes. By making wealth 
transfers conditional on a certain behavior CCTs express social value for that behavior. 
For example, one of the explicit social values underscoring Brazil’s Bolsa Escola 
program was that having children in school was intrinsically a good thing. By attaching 
conditions to wealth transfers contingent on school attendance program designers 
signaled that education was positive outcome and sought to change social norms 
associated so that it would be valued by recipients intrinsically. At the same time students 
are taught the value of an education implicitly, learning its value through their 
enlightenment.  
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Conditionality: Enforcement and Paternalism 
 
Conditions are often justified because there is a persistent underinvestment in 
certain goods. This could result from the poor having a shorter time frame when making 
investment decisions, or misinformation and misguided beliefs about the benefits of 
investing in human capital causing suboptimal investment decisions. These beliefs are 
often self-reinforcing: when an agent acts on the belief they receive the outcome they 
expected, justifying their original position. For example, parents could believe that 
human capital only accumulates to those who have a high level of natural talent, or that 
increasing access to education will not help improve their station in society. These beliefs 
are often held by parents who themselves have little or no education.  When the expected 
outcome occurs as a result of the decision the belief is often reinforced. Misguided 
perception can come from a lack of information or difficulty in understanding the 
information which is available. 101 
Empirical studies have shown that misguided beliefs about expected returns to 
education persist in societies, and that these misconceptions effect personal investment 
decisions.  This has been measured by comparing the expected returns for schooling, 
reported in survey’s of students and parents, and comparing them with the actual data. 
Attanasio and Kauffmann’s study found that for 15-25 year old expected returns were 
smaller than actual returns for education, particularly for children’s who’s fathers did not 
have education, sometimes to the degree of one third of the actual value of the return.102  
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These studies empirically demonstrate that citizen’s perceptions about returns to 
investments are ill-informed, possibly providing a justification for the state to impose 
conditions as well as providing information in order to change how these investments are 
viewed.  
The manner in which conditions are enforced necessarily changes the value 
associated with a program’s outcome. On the one hand conditions can be imposed, like in 
the initial Brazilian case, as a method for ensuring social progress while positively 
protecting the rights of the poor. This uses conditionality as a tool to encourage social 
cohesion while also attempting to meet the preconditions of just interaction, but does not 
necessarily see redistribution as a contingent right. Instead it encourages good behavior 
and acts as a “reinforcement of basic right.”103 Operationally non-compliance is a “red 
flag” which signals to administrators that a family.104 Similarly, conditions can be used 
be used to protect the future rights of children of impoverished parents; expressing the 
value that intergenerational equality is undeserved, and that children of the poor deserve 
as best a chance as possible to be alleviated from systemic poverty. Such a model 
encourages social cohesion by emphasizing affection and respect for the poor by 
providing access to and encouraging use of progressive services. It also minimizes social 
exclusion as it does not implicitly exclude recipients from the redistributive framework, 
though lax enforcement could decrease the program’s potential aggregate outcomes.  
Conditions can also be used as a paternalistic mechanism to coerce behaviors 
which serve broad social ends. This could result in a coercive framework could merely 
                                                 
103
 Britto, Recent Trends in the Development Agenda of Latin America: An Analysis of 
Conditional Cash Transfers, 15 
104
 Lindbert et al.,The Nuts and bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program: Implementing 
Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized  Context, , 55 
78 
 
reflect a broad paternalistic perception: the implicit assumption of conditionality is that if 
it were not for the cash transfer incentive the poor would not choose to invest in human 
capital formation. Society has determined what the best values that should be upheld are, 
and the proper method in which they should be encouraged. Thus we can legitimately 
impose conditions on your consumption because it will result in positive outcomes which 
will improve your well-being. This  to say such a position is a negative thing. Sen 
demonstrates the linkages and tradeoffs of different elements of freedom are sometimes 
necessary in order to improve the long term capabilities of the poor. Enforcing education 
conditionalities in the Bolsa Escola program in Brazil has resulted in over 92 percent of 
the poorest quintile being enrolled in school. Conditionalities have also created 
disincentives for child labor, teen pregnancy, and truancy: absences are recorded and 
segmented into justifiable and unjustifiable categories, with too many unjustifiable 
absences resulting in restrictions on their cash transfer.105  
Incorporative conditionalities can legitimize programs, especially if conditions are 
developed which brought the poor into a discussion of “co-responsibilities.” In Brazil 
conditionalities associated with the Bolsa Familia program have a 97 percent approval 
from a nationally representative survey, and 98 percent approval from cash transfer 
recipients. One of the reasons recipients favor the conditions so strongly is they feel they 
have been involved in the process of shaping the valued outcomes which the program 
seeks to achieve. Local municipalities designing programs along with federal support was 
initially a key element in Brazilian CCT success. This model built municipal capacity and 
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created local level stakeholders who felt they had an interest in the program’s success.106 
Despite these positive benefits, it is important to remember that the most impoverished 
are often the least represented. Thus, local political leaders need to make a specific effort 
to incorporate them when structuring the program’s design, goal, and outcomes.107  
Conditionalities could also be designed and enforced in a way which alienates the 
poor. This could result from legislating a framework which imposes ideals without 
seeking input or encouraging local value sharing; resulting in decreased affection, feeling 
socially marginalized, and decreasing the likelihood that individuals will self target and 
participate in the program. By requiring that recipients perform socially desirable 
behaviors CCTs reinforce the idea of a “deserving poor:” the poor deserved to get this 
money because they have done well by sending their children to school and taking them 
to health clinics regularly. This concept can split the poor into the category of the 
deserving and the undeserving. This could engender resentment from recipients, resulting 
in social isolation, loss of affection, and decreased efficiency of desired outcomes.  
Administration, Centralization, and Politics:  
 
Imposing conditionalities requires extensive oversight of the recipient’s 
compliance and eligibility. As these programs have relatively complex mechanisms of 
targeting and delivery transfers, they require high administrative capability while 
incurring greater costs than normal transfer programs.108 While over time economies of 
scale can decrease these costs, they can initially as a barrier of entry in low income 
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countries, while.  The contextual administrative capacities as well as the targeting 
mechanism employed alter the costs of the program. Where ministerial capacities are 
reasonably well established, one effective minimization strategy is to incorporate CCTs 
into existing in-line activities for ministries and agencies. This strategy was employed in 
both Brazil and Mexico. The success of this method depends on effectively developing 
the proper mechanisms for targeting populations and monitoring compliance with 
conditionalities. Institutional capacity is an important consideration when designing a 
program’s structure. Central administration communicates a broad normative value for a 
particular outcome to the entire society. This is particularly important if the program is 
addressing the lack of a basic right.   
One of the disadvantages is that, while eventually benefiting from economies of 
scale, its initial start up cost is high. Particularly in developing countries there are often 
disconnects between different parts of the government, resulting in inefficiencies and 
wasted resources. Theses inefficiencies can result in resentment by local officials and 
workers to the national agenda, decreasing programmatic outcomes. In determining a 
blanket set of policies centralized systems can also limit the program’s flexibility to deal 
with the particularities of a local issue. Decentralization can, in some contexts, address 
some of these issues. It can increase community affection by incorporating recipients and 
local officials into setting a constructive agenda, creating local investment in the 
program’s outcomes.  
The existing institutional framework as well as the prevailing political and social 
value systems informs policymakers about the advantages and disadvantages of different 
administrative structures.  Social policy can be delivered in a public manner which aims 
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to convey signals of normative social value for desired outcomes. In the best case 
scenario norms can be transferred both by example and by encouraging good behaviors. 
In Brazil, the Bolsa Escola program communicated, among other things, the value that a 
well educated and informed citizenry was social good. At the same time, entrenched 
social and political attitudes which are not in accordance with the desired outcome can 
make reforming social policy by “stealth” a more successful strategy. This method often 
involves implementing decentralized pilot programs at the local level within a particular 
ministry or agency. These policies aim to increase capacities for the least well off, while 
also building a wealth of experience and evidence which can be used to implement larger 
scale reform efforts when the political climate is right. While not initially communicating 
broad support for certain outcomes, they can communicate social values at the grassroots 
levels, while laying the foundation for broader normative programs.109  
Imposing and enforcing conditionalities on cash transfer changes the 
administrative pre-requisites for operability, and alters the relationship between recipients 
and bureaucrats. By empowering local officials to determine eligibility and benefit status 
it can create incentives for leakages and corruption. The risk of corruption is particularly 
high in situations where there is not a lot of administrative oversight, and where broad 
social values are not shared by the program’s implementers. Empowering officials in this 
way can cause resentment on the part of the recipients, making their benefits contingent 
on greasing bureaucratic wheels. Resentment can decrease the likelihood that positive 
behaviors will be transferred. In some situations it can cause a rift between the 
community and programmatic outcomes. Iin others communities might put social 
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pressure on monitors to report high levels of compliance. This is often either because of 
the community’s desire to have more people in the program, or fear of the negative 
consequences of losing benefits.110  One of the advantages of CCTs is that they generally 
employ modern operations which decrease the likelihood of corruption. Beneficiary 
selection and registration, implementing payment and monitoring, and increased 
administrative oversight often decrease corruption. Additionally, CCT programs are often 
implemented as part of a broader reform of social services, regularly leading to the 
elimination of poorly targeted and inefficient programs.111  
In some respects CCTs aim to provide a return to taxpayers, as the behavior they 
reinforce both reflect social values and can result in valued outcomes. Health and 
education are seen as public goods which serve their interest. Increased numbers of 
educated people in a particular geographic area can have a positive impact on overall 
economic growth. Facilitating a feeling of co-responsibility and incorporating  taxpayer 
desires in CCT designs has the advantage of increasing political and social support for the 
program. Elites are more likely to favor redistribution to the deserving poor.112 This 
model can be advantages in political contexts which are hostile to redistribution, as 
recipients have to demonstrate they deserve certain attitudes.113 Engendering a broad 
feeling of co-responsibility and designing a program so that it maximizes public 
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outcomes makes CCT programs more politically stable and likely to survive a regime 
change.  
Education and Health:  
 
The salient feature of most CCTs is conditioning transfers on recipient’s 
participation in programs which seek to increase their or their children’s human capital. 
Usually conditionalities require enrollment and attendance in school for a certain number 
of days, as well as regular checkups at health clinics. They are necessary because these 
public goods are underutilized by individuals in a society; children are often absent or 
truant from school, and immunization rates and use of health clinics is low. Encouraging 
these behaviors is particularly important as their outcomes promote an individual’s 
welfare in many different ways. These conditions seek to address the root causes of 
systemic poverty, encouraging the adoption of positive behaviors which will give the 
impoverished the tools to improve their welfare and live a better life.  
Those two outcomes are often mutually reinforcing: improving health often has 
positive impacts on education, and vice versa. Work by Jalan and Ravallion showed that 
improving piped water only had a positive health in households with educated mothers, 
while Miguel and Kremer show how health investments can improve education.114 
Recognizing that investments in child well-being are interlinked in important ways, CCTs 
seek to encourage human capital accumulation at children’s earliest stages by taking 
advantages of synergies between improvements in cognitive skills, behavior outcomes, 
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and child health.115 Having a healthy and enlightened citizenry is often considered a 
public good which society has an interest in promoting. The fact CCTs encourage the 
development of public good’s is one of the reasons they have gained political popularity 
in developing countries and have been able to survive regime changes.  
Both health and education are interconnected with and often a precondition of 
numerous other desired outcomes.  The goal of these programs is to encourage positive 
norms associated with these behaviors so in the long run human capital accumulates to 
the poor without the need of wealth transfers to encourage positive behavior. 
Additionally, programmatic structures which commit transfers to marginalized segments 
of population often promote other associated benefits. For example, many programs give 
transfers to the female head of households. This is often done because research has 
indicated that women are more likely to spend the money on goods which improve the 
well-being of the family. As of 2009, of the 31 CCTs which were in existence worldwide, 
17 provided transfers to the female head of the household. An associated benefit of this 
design is that it empowers the social and economic status of women, and works to change 
social norms which have historically caused their marginalization. Because they often 
transfer benefits directly to a recipient’s bank account, an ancillary outcome of these 
programs is that they increase the poor’s incorporation in credit markets and the banking 
system.116 Promoter’s of CCT program often argue that because of the interrelated 
elements associated with health and education related outcomes, as well as the benefits 
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which come from using wealth transfers to incorporate marginalized groups, conditioning 
transfers is a justifiable practice for effective social policies.  
Conditionality: Health   
 
In many respects being healthy and free from debilitating disease and 
malnourishment is the fundamental precondition for the realization of other welfare 
values. The UN declaration of human rights recognizes that “everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family...”117 In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs having secure health is a primary element of 
personal safety, and a necessary precursor for social and civic engagement.   Poor health 
plagues the impoverished in developing countries, causing malnutrition, anemia and 
under-development in children. Poor health lowers the number of days the impoverished 
work and their children attend school. It also increases mortality rates, fertility rates, 
hurting early cognitive development and increasing the likelihood that an individual will 
remain trapped in poverty. In aggregate, poor health increases the risk of epidemics 
caused by communicable diseases, while decreasing economic output and causing the 
poor to live a lower quality of life. Being healthy is a precondition for living a good life 
and being an equitable member of society. Consequently, conditionalities associated with 
health related outcomes are often established to create the just preconditions for social 
interaction and individual well-being.  
Health’s primacy is recognized by a number of the philosophers we have 
examined. Rawls argues that, even in the thin theory of justice, it is a fundamental 
primary good and would be a legitimate use of a redistributed wealth. Kant maintains 
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health is a primary component of the most necessary needs which are required to 
establish the background conditions for social interaction. Citizens need to have a basic 
level of health care in order to stand in the right relations to one another.118  Sen regards 
inadequate health as a capability handicap.119 He points out health has both intrinsic and 
instrumental value: it is desired in itself and is a precondition for engaging in numerous 
social and market relations.  
Nozick’s argument that mandatory taxation which reaches beyond the needs of 
the minimum state as well as his position that redistribution is an unjust burden on part of 
society would generally place him against conditional health programs. However, his 
position might change if the health outcome which the conditionality sought to address 
was a result of negative externalities from legitimate transfers, and thus would not exist 
in the state of nature. This could possibly be the case in situations where pollution 
resulting from legitimate transfers was the cause of health problems. 
 Conditionalities associated with healthcare seek to address these underlying 
concerns by using preventative care to improve children’s long term health prospects as 
well as helping their cognitive development. The goal is to improve the immediate and 
long term well-being for the poor while instilling a positive behavioral norm for regularly 
attending health clinics. Conditionalities generally take the form of regular checkups, 
childhood growth and development monitoring, and compliance with immunization 
coverage.  Progress in improved nutritional status is measured by increases in childhood 
height and weight, while progress in cognitive development can be measured in 
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improvements in language development, gross and fine motor skills, personal behavioral 
skills, and incidence of behavior problems. 
 Recent studies by Macours, Schady, and Vakis have demonstrated that the 
Atencion in Crisis program in Nicaragua resulted in improved development in language 
and behavioral skills. These benefits are particularly robust when children are enrolled in 
the program before they enter school. Their results also demonstrated spillover effects, as 
improvement in these outcomes were found in children who were not the target of the 
program.120 These results are important because they demonstrate both the powerful 
cognitive outcomes which can result from improvement in childhood nutrition, but also 
show the power of changing normative values of a particular behavior. Work by Strauss 
and Thomas has also found that improving healthcare increase the long term wage 
prospects for adult Brazilian’s. Body mass index, nutrient intakes, and height were found 
to be powerful predictors of wages in the urban market. While this data focuses on adults, 
it demonstrates the crucial point that health related outcomes are directly linked to future 
earning potential. These studies show how conditionalities associated with health can 
practically improve the immediate well-being and development of its recipients, as well 
as improving their long term earning potential. 
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Education:  
 
While being healthy and reasonably well fed are vital components for living a 
minimal existence, being educated is often an essential component for full social 
inclusion.  The 26th article of the UN declaration of human rights affirms the “right to a 
free and compulsory education with the goal of strengthening human rights and 
fundamental freedom.”121 This right is particularly affirmed at the primary education 
level. Unfortunately global enrollment rates don’t reflect this right.As of 2009, over 15 
countries had over 25 percent of their children out of primary education, while statistics 
on secondary enrollment were significantly worse.122  
Low enrollment rates and poor attendance often results from the parent’s belief 
that education is not a worthwhile investment, and that their children’s efforts are best 
used in contributing to the household’s income.  Ferreira has formalized a model which 
explains individual welfare in terms of consumption during two periods of life: childhood 
as well as adulthood. Children can contribute to household’s resources during their 
childhood by spending some of their time working, but this time is spent at the expense 
of studying or being in school. Their contribution can come in the form of working on the 
family’s farm, helping out with household duties, or being employed in wage labor. 
Current consumption from childhood labor often comes at the expense of adulthood 
consumption, as expected future consumption diminishes with decreased skill levels.123  
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Placing conditional incentives on education aims to change the investment choice made 
by parents regarding their children’s allocation of time.  
The interrelated values which education provides is recognized and explicated by 
a number of the thinkers which have been examined.  Rawls found education and 
enlightenment as a good which transcends economic efficiency and social welfare 
considerations. Education is a necessary requirement for an individual to enjoy the 
culture of his society, take part in its affairs, and secure the sense of his own worth. In 
Sen’s terminology this is education’s intrinsic value. Its instrumental value is broad and 
far reaching: it allows people to feel a part of the member of society, improving social 
values of rectitude and respect, while providing them with the critical thinking skills 
necessary for improving one’s economic status.   
Ripstein, as well as Rawls and Sen, focuses the way improving education 
increases the skill set of an individual, improving their long term economic prospects, 
while also increasing their ability to engage with other elements of society. In terms of 
increasing political freedom, the state has an interest in publicly funding education 
because it establishes the legitimate preconditions for public lawgiving and private 
interaction based on the rightful conditions. An educated population is partially protected 
against poverty, and publicly funded universal education is an investment against future 
dependence. Civic education also lays the preconditions for establishing the rightful 
condition allowing one to stand by their rights against private persons and the state.124  It 
is also justified because only an educated population can legitimately give laws to itself 
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in accordance with the original contract. 125  This is not to say that education will 
necessarily result in reflective voters, but it is a precondition for having reflective voters.  
Education facilitates the expansion of political freedoms, and could be construed 
as a prerequisite for the state to legitimately legislate laws. Imposing conditionality on 
education is often justified because of the numerous interrelated instrumental benefits 
which accrue from human capital development as well as the intrinsic benefits which 
come from being educated. Additionally, incorporating marginalized social groups into 
the programs benefit structure, like attaching cash transfers to female children’s 
attendance on school. Chapter V will take an in-depth look at conditionality and 
education policy in Brazil.   
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Chapter IV: The Spectrum of Conditionality 
 
Introduction:  
 
Chapter One explored the structural foundations of CCTs, examining the different 
potential programmatic designs and delivery mechanisms. Chapters two and three 
explicated different systems of valuation, explored how values are transmitted in society, 
and examined how different structural designs of CCTs can affect desired outcomes. This 
Chapter draws on the above discussions to define a framework that can be used by 
policymakers seeking to establish a CCT program. Using the philosophical positions 
previously explicated, it will examine what background conditions justify a CCTs, and 
which conditionalities are appropriate depending on the . This section seeks to establish a 
continuum of conditionality, from the position which is least open to conditions, the 
argument advanced by Nozick, to the one which is most open to conditions, the utilitarian 
position. It will locate where on this continuum each of the philosophers stands, and 
examine the relative strengths and tradeoffs of the particular position. The framework in 
this section will provide guidance for policymakers adhering to one or more 
philosophical positions by specifying the conditions which would justify CCTs and the 
program designs which best succeed in upholding its values.  
Robert Nozick: The Primacy of Liberty 
 
 The libertarian position advanced by Robert Nozick frames one side of the 
continuum. His argument establishes individual liberty as paramount, a consideration 
which cannot be subsumed for a greater social good.126 He argues there are natural rights 
to property and freedom of action which precede and cause the development of the state 
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through the invisible hand process. Restrictions on action come in the form of side 
constraints, prohibitions on one’s actions violating the rights of others in the pursuit of 
his goal.127  Individual liberty is protected to the extent that no new rights emerge at the 
group level which are beyond the preexisting individual ones. Since liberty is all but 
absolute, his position precludes paternalistic restrictions on liberty legislated by the state; 
allowing that a person may “choose or permit another to do to himself anything, unless he 
has already made some obligation to a third party.”128 This ultimate protection of liberty 
allows an individual to make choices which are detrimental to their health or wellbeing if 
they so choose.   
For Nozick, a distribution is just if it arose from another just distribution by 
legitimate means, in accordance with the principle of acquisition. The only time an 
individual can lay claim on another is if a person’s transactions causes harm to a third 
party such that it would violate the minimum conditions established by the proviso. The 
state’s function is to provide general protection for transactions, and enforce the principle 
of rectification when illegitimate transactions occur.  
 Asserting the priority of liberty and the principle of justice in acquisition leaves 
very little room for redistribution and conditionality. If one adheres to his libertarian 
roots, the only time when redistributions are justified is when they are necessary to 
permit a baseline distribution of wealth required to satisfy the minimum conditions of the 
proviso. Nozick argues the principle of acquisition shadows transfer, and in cases where 
transfers violate the terms of the proviso or when they are necessary to compensate for 
historical redress, then conditions based redistribution would be justified. Policymakers 
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seeking to maximize individual liberty in accordance with a Nozickian framework of 
rights need to contextually examine both the historical record of transactions which led to 
the current distribution and current transactions to ensure they do not result in a net loss 
of individual liberty.129 This would require an extensive knowledge what the conditions 
of poverty are in a particular country, as well as the historical processes which led to the 
current state. In situations where state centered redistribution must occur, conditions 
associated with wealth transfers would be justified, provided they increased the speed by 
which the economic condition of the least well off is improved.  
Adhering to Nozick’s strict libertarian framework may result in situations where 
the rich are getting less of a return for their money by paying for protective services 
instead of simply redistributing wealth. For example, there could be a scenario where the 
poor are highly disruptive to other members of the economy to the degree that it is 
necessary for the state to use its policing services in order to allow transactions, but the 
poor are not below the minimal baseline conditions. In this case, it may be possible that 
redistribution to the poor would cost less than paying for policing activities. A strict 
interpretation would say that this form of redistribution is illegitimate. 130 If liberty is 
truly a priority, then the state can take actions to limit their disruptions, but it cannot force 
redistribution from one group to another in order to establish the environment for secure 
transactions.  
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This is not to say redistribution cannot be a privately contracted arrangement.  
Nozick would be in favor of voluntary redistributive programs where the wealthy 
transferred money along with conditions with the implicit understanding that the poor 
would improve their standing in exchange for the transfers. Similarly, community level 
transactions where all members mutually agree on redistributive policy could be a 
legitimate framework for redistribution. These structures are within the domain of private 
transactions, and are not a consideration for the state. Nozick’s argument establishes the 
primary position liberties have, and sets a strict criterion for situations where 
redistribution would be legitimate.  
Rawls: Justice as Fairness 
 
 Like Nozick, Rawls asserts the primary place that rights and liberties have in an 
analysis of justice. However, unlike Nozick, Rawls argues there are certain fundamental 
rights, enumerated by the two principles of justice, which set preconditions for the 
exercise of rights and liberties. It establishes the right to a certain minimum income, as 
well as fair equality of opportunity and institutional guarantees of fundamental liberties. 
This process sets the framework for social cooperation, which is the foundation for 
productive activity.131 Justice as fairness is determined by an index of primary goods: the 
things needed over the course of their lives by citizens fulfilling the political conception 
of persons and operating as cooperative members of society. Primary goods include basic 
rights and liberties, the freedom of movement and free choice in occupation, power and 
prerogatives of offices and positions of authority, a level of income and wealth, and the 
social basis of self respect. Rawls argues that citizens’ needs are sufficiently comparable 
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for the index of primary goods to serve as a suitable and fair basis of interpersonal 
comparison. The principles of justice assess the basic structure in accordance with how it 
“regulates citizens’ shares of primary goods” 132 
Conditionalities are justified when the background institutional structure of pre-
procedural justice has not been met or when inequality of opportunity is precluded. The 
framework he establishes recognizes the lexical priority of the principles of justice, and 
allows for tradeoffs in order to establish the just preconditions for social cooperation. 
This caveat is particularly interesting: while Rawls recognizes fundamental rights to 
wealth and income, he acknowledges that securing these rights is conditional on securing 
equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is comprised of a set of interrelated 
factors, such as safe housing, basic health and education, which Rawls highlights as a 
fundamental primary good necessary for a citizen to engage in social cooperation. The 
value of education and healthcare comes from the need for citizens to participate in the 
legislative stage. Health care restores citizens so they can be functional members of 
society, while education gives them the tools to exercise their political freedoms. The 
value of a minimal income inequality in accordance with the difference principle is 
contingent on securing equality of opportunity.  
His account requires the establishment of the basic structures of the background 
institutions of justice so that citizens have the ability to train their capabilities and a fair 
opportunity to make use of them. “It is left to citizens as free and equal persons, secure in 
their basic rights and liberties and able to take charge of their own life, to avail 
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themselves of the opportunities guaranteed to all on a fair basis.”133 Providing basic 
capabilities they are able to function as free and equal citizens and have fair equality of 
opportunity, but that once these pre-conditions have been met it is up to the citizens to act 
on their liberties and individual preferences as they see fit.134    While Rawls is similar to 
Nozick in that he upholds individual liberty and preferences, he recognizes these liberties 
are preconditioned on basic institutions and equality of opportunity. Conditionalities are a 
legitimate goal for achieving these ends because they operate as a means of establishing 
an expectation of primary goods which facilitates equality of opportunity and establishes 
a just institutional structure. While they may not be sufficient to guarantee full equality of 
opportunity, their focus on health and education makes them a highly effective tool 
establishing a crucial element of the just preconditions.  
Rawls’ position is particularly useful for policymakers who appeal to fundamental 
rights or the idea of social debt as justifications for redistributive policies. It provides a 
framework for them to analyze the structures which uphold basic rights, while also 
justifying conditionalities which address them.  In order to create appropriate 
conditionalities, a contextual understanding of the existing distribution of primary goods 
is of paramount importance.  To determine the legitimacy of CCTs policymakers need to 
examine the current institutional framework, particularly the level of incorporation of the 
most disadvantaged in the political and legal system, as well as the extent of health and 
educational services. Social norms of exclusion of particular demographic groups, for 
example the marginalization of women, need to be incorporated into benefit structures. 
Because Rawls is particularly concerned about maximizing social cooperation, 
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incorporating the community the development and implementation of conditions is 
crucial for achieving successful outcomes. 135  
Ripstein: The Benefits and Constraints of the Rightful Condition 
 
Ripstein occupies an integral place on the conditionality continuum. He provides 
a justification for social provisions based on the necessity of establishing the rightful 
conditions for social interaction and forming a united will, while simultaneously using 
these same principles to create an upper bound on providing conditions-based support. 
This framework allows him to concurrently justify legitimate rights which are necessary 
background conditions for the exercise of liberty while restricting the state’s interference 
in individual lives. Ripstein’s argument hinges on two elements: the necessity of having a 
united will for just political authority, and the implications of establishing the rightful 
conditions for equitable social interaction. His argument allows for tradeoffs when 
implementing conditionality, provided that background conditions have not been met.  
Ripstein argues that a government can only have public authority if it is 
accountable to the people. Because “people cannot give itself laws which its members 
could not consent,”136 legislating laws on oneself requires a united will of the populace. 
Further, as was discussed in Chapter Two, one can only have effective accountability if 
one has people who are educated, healthy, and capable of being politically engaged. 
While Kant upholds the right of individual freedom, he argues this freedom is contingent 
on securing the rightful background conditions. Establishing the rightful conditions 
requires health, a basic level of education, and a capacity for political and social 
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engagement. Imposing conditionalities secures the preconditions for the exercise of 
freedom.  
For Ripstein, achieving certain background conditions are necessary for the 
exercise of freedom, one of which is the freedom from being entirely subject to the 
choice of another. Therefore, unlike Nozick who argues individual liberties are absolute 
to the point where one could sell oneself into slavery if he wanted to, such a decision 
would violate the background conditions of individual freedom and thus would be void.  
Interestingly, what entitles one to be a chooser, his status as a free being, also limits the 
extent to which redistribution can occur. Once the legitimate conditions of independence 
are secured, the private right to choose how best to live one’s life in accordance with ones 
preferences takes over. Any further conditionality’s would be a violation of one’s 
individual freedom. For example, after a provision for basic health care is established, it 
is discovered that leading a vegetarian lifestyle improves the wellbeing of citizens. 
Imposing this restriction on individual behavior would be illegitimate, even if it results in 
a better outcome for the individual, because it would be a violation of individual freedom.  
Because freedom is contingent on establishing the right preconditions, Ripstein’s 
argument allows for trade-offs between different provisions which establish the 
background conditions prior to their realization. Such trade-offs would generally be 
justified if they could bring an individual closer to fulfilling his most basic necessary 
needs. However, once the background conditions are established, any trade off with 
individual liberty would be illegitimate.   
Ripstein’s argument establishes an upper bound on legitimate conditionalities 
which can be imposed by the state. So doing, he creates a clear bright-line which 
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policymakers can use to delineate legitimate conditionality programs. It is clear that 
conditionality programs are desirable if they can secure the education and health related 
outcomes which establish the background conditions for freedom. They are particularly 
useful if they can promote social incorporation and political understanding, both of which 
are necessary for both the rightful conditions and establishing a united will. Whether such 
a program is necessary or not depends on the contextual factors in a society. Whether the 
poor are already fully participating citizens in the social and democratic process makes a 
difference to the desirability of conditionality programs. Similarly, current institutional 
capacity for providing basic health services and the scope of education alter the 
framework of the program’s design, and change its target audience. The state also has a 
duty to guarantee formal equality of opportunity.137 The extent to which this exists within 
a society and in what areas it is lacking will dictate the particulars of the program. The 
degree to which these programs redistribute is restricted by the upper limit. Thus it is 
particularly important that CCTs have an effectively designed exit system to graduate 
recipients from the program once the background conditions of freedom have been met.  
Amartya Sen: Trade-Offs and Freedom 
 
 As was enumerated in Chapter II, Amartya Sen argues that development should 
be understood in terms of the actual freedoms, separated into five categories, a policy 
achieved. These freedoms are measured in terms of increased individual capabilities. 
Because poverty consists in capability deprivation, overcoming poverty requires 
improvements in the capabilities the poor have. Sen argues for a continuum of 
enhancement of capabilities or freedoms, whose interconnected nature naturally 
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augments one another as they expand. societal terms interpersonal comparisons of 
capabilities require an “aggregation over heterogeneous components,” meaning there is a 
distinct social element in determining the value of a particular freedom. Additionally, the 
capability perspective has the advantage over the human capital perspective by allowing 
one to value the particular means an individual uses to achieve a particular goal, not just a 
desired end.138  
In terms of conditionality, Sen would argue that CCTs would be desirable if they 
can accomplish an increase in the real freedom for a society. Therefore, he is in a unique 
position to support the enhancement of programs which most effectively expand 
capabilities, even if they come at the expense of trading off with other capabilities in the 
short term. Sen is able to make tradeoffs between restrictions on some kinds of freedoms 
in order to achieve a greater outcome in another kind of freedom which, to varying 
degrees, Rawls, Nozick, and Ripstein are unable to. He is unburdened by their normative 
frameworks. In certain important ways Sen is a consequentialist. By looking at the 
aggregate freedoms of a particular program he is assuming an outcome based approach. 
At the same time he acknowledges there are certain intrinsic and instrumental advantages 
to freedom; for example, education increases one’s enlightenment, skill set, ability to 
participate socially, and the potential for political freedoms. Further, he acknowledges 
that it is not justifiable to sacrifice certain values for other desirable outcomes. For 
example, one cannot completely sacrifice political freedoms for economic opportunities: 
what would be the point of being rich if one lost all political freedom?   Some of these 
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outcomes are intrinsically valuable, such as increased enlightenment, while others, such 
as increased political potential, are instrumentally valuable.  
Evaluating conditionality in a freedom framework necessarily depends on the 
existing capabilities in a particular society, the intrapersonal valuation of capabilities, and 
the interpersonal conception of valued outcomes. The advantage Sen gives to 
policymakers is a framework through which one can effectively evaluate and weigh the 
different potential outcomes of a particular program. Given the fundamental intrinsic and 
instrumental value Sen places on health and education, programs which emphasize 
increasing these capabilities are likely to be supported by this framework. 
Acknowledging the interconnected elements of many of the basic freedoms, it is quite 
likely that an increase in one capability, such as education, will eventually result in 
improving other capabilities, like market participation. Thus, programs need to take into 
account the short term and long term benefits of their outcomes. Freedom is additionally 
beneficial because it takes incorporates the decision making process as well as the valued 
outcomes, implying that participation in value sharing and political decision making has 
an intrinsic worth. This model also allows one to examine the potential opportunities 
which an individual might achieve, in addition to the potential outcomes of an action.139  
Conditionality programs are justified when they address the contextual capability 
deprivation in a society by using redistribution and conditions to increase freedoms. For 
these programs to achieve their desired outcomes it is crucial that policymakers are aware 
of the current level of capability deprivation in society. Thus it is important to whether 
the poor are fully participating citizens, in a political, economic, and social context. 
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Knowledge of the extent and reach of education and health care, as well as the social 
values surrounding these programs, would also be critical information. Fundamentally, it 
is important to know the relative intrapersonal and normative interpersonal valuation 
which is placed on particular freedoms, as these will inform both the degree of the trade-
off which would result from a program and the effectiveness of a particular policy. One 
advantage of an interconnected freedoms view is that policymakers can design programs 
such that they address numerous concerns in one fell swoop. Say for example women 
have been historically marginalized, and health and education for families is poor. 
Adopting  a program which postulated that expanding women’s education is the best way 
to increase women’s and children’s health, and that the program would give grants only if 
family’s sent their daughters to school, would address many of these interconnected 
concerns.   Nevertheless, while enabling a contextual valuation of constituent freedoms 
and relevant tradeoffs because Sen. Regards certain values as fundamental, he does not 
completely disregard the normative framework adhered to by Rawls and Nozick.   
Utilitarianism: Ultimate Conditionality 
 
Because the essence of utilitarianism is that, “the moral worth of an action is to be 
judged by the effect of promoting happiness—surplus of pleasure over pain”—
aggregated across all inhabitants of society,”140 The theory postulates that only outcomes 
matter, normative policies should be evaluated by how much they promote welfare in 
society. Utility can be measured in numerous ways, for example some recent work has 
tried to attach a utility weighted utility to individuals receiving or providing wealth 
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transfers depending on their socioeconomic status, but in general utilitarian evaluate a 
policy by aggregating the utility in a society 
Simply put conditionality’s are justifiable if they increase the aggregate welfare in 
a society, and are not if they do not. Because it does not adhere to any a priori value 
structure, the significant elements of a program are solely determined by how much 
utility is achieved with an outcome. Provided an improvement in the aggregate is 
increased, utilitarianism allows for any conditionality, resulting in extreme tradeoffs of 
liberties for welfare. Utilitarianism is thus almost the polar opposite of the view advanced 
by Nozick, providing no fundamental guarantee of right in the face of redistributive 
programs. This is not to say that utility is deals solely with economic activities, social 
interaction and marriages deal in areas where pure monetary transactions rarely exist. 141 
Further, as Posner points out, if a particular outcome could be wealth maximizing it could 
justify numerous restrictive conditions. The implicit disadvantage of working through a 
utilitarian framework is that one comes across numerous outcomes which seem morally 
suspect explicitly corrupt. Nevertheless, in allowing a trade off of any rights 
utilitarianism provides the challenge to the other philosophers to justify that they have the 
better framework.  
While it is unlikely that a policymaker follows a strictly utilitarian line of 
thinking, consequentialist frameworks are often used to evaluate the outcomes of a social 
policy. Any conditions and conditionalities would be justified provided the outcome 
increased aggregate utility. In operating under a conditional framework policymakers 
need to know the societies utility functions, how it values different elements, and how a 
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policies outcomes might shift the social norms which determine the weight of a valuation. 
Policymakers also have to determine how they are discounting utility in the future versus 
utility today; as the restriction on freedom of action for the recipients of wealth transfers 
could cause relative disutility. In general, because the outcomes of CCTs general target 
those who will receive the highest marginal utility from the benefit, outcomes will result 
in a higher aggregate utility, particularly if human capital accumulation increases the long 
term earning potential for a society.  They also need to determine whether they are 
operating on a traditional aggregate utility framework, or a nuanced marginal utility 
metric.  If one applies a nuanced metric a greater amount of conditional redistribution 
will be justified, as the marginal utility to the rich will be subsumed by the marginal 
utility to the poor, and the conditions associated with the wealth transfer will decrease the 
disutility for the payee.142 Because classic utilitarianism operates at the far side of the 
conditionalities continuum it is unlikely a poor model will be used by policymakers. 
Nevertheless, evaluating a redistributive framework through a utilitarian perspective can 
be useful because it throws all the cards on the table and allows one to see all the 
potential tradeoffs which could occur with a particular policy.  
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Chapter V: Analyzing the Evolution of Social Policy in Brazil: 
 
 
Philosophical positions are not discussed in a vacuum; their premises are debated 
by policymakers every day. This discussion is particularly evident when developing 
conditions based wealth transfers. The development of redistributive policies and CCTs 
in Brazil is a fascinating example of how shifting policy frameworks and social values 
informed and shaped a country’s social welfare system. The debate in Brazil drew 
heavily on the idea that, because of previous inequality and marginalization, there was a 
social debt owed to society’s poor. Many segments of society argued there was a right to 
a basic minimum income, level of education, and access to health services. These ideas 
are strikingly similar to the position Rawls advances regarding the background conditions 
necessary for exercising fundamental liberties, though many of the justifications also 
accord with other philosophical positions. Because of the visible discussion of social 
values and policy design, Brazil is an ideal case for examining how philosophical 
viewpoints can both inform policymaking and be used to evaluate a particular program. 
Explicitly enumerating and critically analyzing this process in Brazil is an instructive 
exercise for policymakers who are seeking to construct policies in their own country.  
Between the 1930’s and 1970’s the oligarchic and then dictatorial federalist 
government implemented a social welfare system which was both centralized and 
focused on issues associated with the country’s rapid urbanization. While the model 
which emerged from this process was relatively large in scope, increasing the 
institutional scope of education, health, social welfare, and public housing policies, these 
programs were mainly targeted to the workers who paid into the system. The social 
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system was highly centralized at the federal executive level.143 The most visible program 
was the Brazilian League for Social Assistance (LBA), which was created in the 
1940’s.144 The pattern of social protection was a system which was selective in 
determining beneficiaries, heterogeneous in determining benefits, and fragmented both 
institutionally and finically.145 As a result of focusing on issues associated with 
urbanization, its policies were primarily designed as a social safety net for workers. 
Despite expressing a high value for social safety nets, as is evidenced by a 62 percent 
increase in social expenditures during this period, institutional inefficiencies and poor 
targeting resulted in massive inequalities and social exclusion: the Gini coefficient rose 
from 0.58 in 1980 to 0.64 in 1989.146  Minimum incomes and welfare policies for non-
workers were either poorly addressed or ignored entirely, and many peoples, particularly 
in rural areas, slipped through the cracks. 
 As democratic principles and liberalization began to influence the country’s 
politics in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s grassroots organization began to transform the 
social agenda. Middle class and union organizations, particularly the Central Workers 
Union and General Workers Union, began to express demands for expansion of rights 
and social policies. These movements expressed “new collective identities” of their 
“corporate interests.”147 Their impact was augmented by increasing awareness of 
iniquitous development in the country, and their presence sparked a national debate 
national values which would define Brazil’s new constitution.   
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Confrontations in the early 1980’s defined the social issue on the democratic 
agenda, particularly the debate between an employment based economic development 
strategy advanced by the conservatives—arguing for stabilization policies which would 
boost employment and increases in salaries, and the social policy reforms advocated by 
new political forces. 148,149 The new agenda included calls for:  
1. Immediate action to alleviate poverty which would be concentrated on 
the most poor and indigent parts of the population  
2. Improved levels of efficiency and redistribution for social expenditure 
programs, incorporating significant changes in their financing 
structure.  
3. A reform of the parameters of social protection using a criteria which 
was more socially just in terms of equality and equity 
4. Administrative reform of the institutions responsible for social 
policies, correcting for distortions and support issues. 150 
 
These positions framed the evolving discussion of social policy reform. During the mid 
1980’s Brazil underwent a major transformation, as the centralized authoritarian 
government transitioned to a decentralized framework, with greater emphasis on 
municipality incorporation and participation in policymaking. The dynamic shift in social 
value structures is particularly evident in the debate about the new constitution.  
A powerful notion which emerged from this debate was the idea that during the 
authoritarian regimes’ rule society had accrued a “social debt” to its citizens which had 
been marginalized. The discussion coalesced around what obligations the social debt 
created, and which policies were necessary to fulfill these demands  
 Ratified in 1988, the constitution institutionalized a number of the principles 
enumerated above. It emphasized the need for reducing poverty and creating a just and 
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equitable society.151 The constitution established a legal foundation for social protection 
as a guaranteed right of the needy, and created an obligation for the state to provide 
health and education services as a basic right to all citizens. It weakened contributions as 
a structural component of the system, and provided for the universalization of access and 
an expansion of coverage. It also redefined minimum levels of value in terms of social 
benefits, gave a commitment by the state for elevated levels of social good and services, 
and guaranteed the irreducibility of benefit values. It decentralized the institutional 
apparatus and emphasized community participation, both of which allowed greater 
amounts of social participation and local input. 152 The new constitution generally moved 
the country from a meritocratic-particularistic model of redistribution towards social 
democratic redistributive model.153  
Protecting these elements as a fundamental right created an obligation for society 
to provide them to the poor, while potentially limiting the restrictions which can be 
placed on the poor’s ability to act as they wished.  They are justified as a precondition for 
living in society and constituted an historical obligation. The constitutional guarantees, 
particularly the minimum benefit level and guarantee of basic health and well-being, set 
certain minimum conditions which were seen as rights of citizenship.154 Even though the 
provision for basic rights was enshrined in its founding document, it was not necessarily 
the case that health and education services were actually available to the poor. Thus it 
became the task of policymakers to develop systems which were capable of addressing 
the institutional gap. During this period legislative reforms attempted to keep up with the 
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constitutional ones. For example, the Cruzado Plan, introduce in 1986, increased the 
minimum wage and social security plans by 15 percent while removing the contributory 
element in social programs.  
In 1991 Senator Eduardo Suplicy introduced a national minimum income 
program, the Programa de Garantia de Renda Minima, which a used negative income tax 
on workers over the age of 25 who earned twice the minimum wage, the established 
poverty line. In order to combat a labor disincentive the program indexed benefit levels to 
30 percent of the difference between the individual’s income and the minim wage. 155 
This program was important in that it was the first to be both benefit informal workers 
and target the poorest families. Its universal reach broke with the “clientalist feature of 
the Brazilian social policy,” 156 while its explicit goal of fighting inequality was a 
significant break from previous political practice.  While the program mainly focused on 
poverty alleviation, ignoring many of the structural elements of poverty, it was an 
important signal from the national government about a significant change in the country’s 
social value structure.  
Taking up the idea that structural and immediate causes of poverty need to be 
addressed through social policies, local municipalities began to develop cash transfer 
programs which would create incentives for improving human capital as well as fulfill 
the constitutional obligation to address poverty.  These programs accompanied a 
significant decentralization of tax revenue to states and municipalities, increasing by 13 
percent and 30 percent respectively in 1993. 157 Programs emerged as a result of two 
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fundamental ideas formed during the constitutional debate. The first was the idea that the 
poor had a right to a basic minimum income, while the second argued that poverty 
reduction strategies needed to address structural conditions of poverty, in addition to 
symptomatic ones. Education in particular was seen as a crucial tool for breaking the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty, but policymakers recognized the need to provide 
financial support in order to maintain attendance of the poorest students.158 
Emerging from these basic principles, the Bolsa Escola Program was started in 
the Brasila and Campinas municipalities in 1995 by Governor Buarque and Mayor 
Teixeira respectively.159 Following their initial success, many municipalities adopted 
their own BEPs based on the original model. The number of municipalities with BEPs 
increased from six at the end of 1995 to fifty-eight by 1999. While each program was 
contextually designed in order to address local concerns, they broadly shared six uniform 
elements. They established a minimum income threshold for eligibility, either ½ or ¼ of 
the minimum wage or a threshold between $35 and $60. They required recipients to have 
school age children, usually between the ages of 7 and 14, though others expanded the 
age bracket. BEPs generally had a two year residency requirement for eligibility, though 
there was a range between one and five years. A large number of the programs also 
targeted transfers to the female head of the household.160 The programs allowed benefits 
as long as recipients remained eligible, and established conditions of a minimum 
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attendance record for transfers, though some also incorporated scholastic performance 
and extra-curricular participation.161 
The Bolsa Escola Program is particularly interesting in that it received broad 
support from across the political spectrum. “its unusual combination of left-wing and 
liberal positions” …”was reflected in the diversity of political actors who supported the 
program.”162 This support reflected a national consensus among elites that the country’s 
problems were a result of “low levels of schooling and health care and high levels of 
poverty and inequality.”163 One of the primary reasons CCTs have been so successful is 
policymakers have been able to design programs which broadly share values with 
numerous members of society.  
Following the initial popularity and success of the program the federal 
government began to provide co-financing for municipalities in 1998. This was initially 
done through the Minimum Income Guarantee Program (PRGM) which was 
implemented in 1998. PRGM provided 50 percent co financing to municipalities who 
were implementing CCT programs. This was essential in promoting and maintaining 
municipal CCT programs. 164 
Notwithstanding the success of municipal BEPs, their increasing popularity called 
for greater national coordination. This was driven by large variations in coverage, ranging 
from 6.5 percent to 45 percent of the eligible families, and the fact that the poorest 
municipalities which were in greatest need of the BEP program but had the fewest 
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resources to pay for them: CCTs in the poorer north accounted between 11.5 and 19.2 
percent of the governments revenue, while the wealthier South paid between 0.2 and 3.6 
percent of their revenue on BEP.165 In response to these worries, and capitalizing on a 
favorable political climate, President Cardoso implemented the National Bolsa Familia 
Program (NBEP) in 2001. This increased the amount of resources available for transfers 
up to $680 million, though this represented 0.7 percent of federal social expenditure.166 
The NBEP changed existing BEPs by implementing uniform “designs and 
parameters,”167 establishing common eligibility criteria, thresholds, benefits, and 
conditionalities among all municipalities. It also changed the programs’ funding 
structure, establishing federal municipal partnerships where the federal government 
“designed, coordinated, and financed” benefits, while municipalities were responsible for 
implementing the programs. The federal government also directly executed transfers 
using electronic cards to transfer money to recipients. 168 
Following the success of the NBEEP program the federal government 
implemented a number of other CCT programs targeting different demand side issues for 
the poor. These included the Bolsa Alimentacao program in 2001, which aimed to reduce 
infant mortality and nutritional deficiency by targeting transfers to families with young 
children conditional on complying with health care visits, growth monitoring, and 
nutritional education seminars. Additionally, the Auxiliio Gas (2002) and Fome Zero 
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(2003) programs transferred money in order to reduce transportation costs and the risk of 
extreme poverty for the poor. 169 
 In 2003 the government launched the Bolsa Familia program. Over its first four 
years the program consolidated and integrated federal CCTs under one overarching 
framework. It aimed to promote efficiency by reducing administrative costs, improving 
the system for identifying a target population, advancing the synergies between health 
and education, improving monitoring and evaluation, and promoting vertical integration 
in order to take advantage of complementarities between national and sub national 
programs.170 The program provided transfer values which favored the extreme poor, 
families with children, and which was simple to administer. It provided simple and 
variable benefits, with the former going to all poor families, and the later going to 
families with children, though with benefit levels capped at three.  
The average benefit for families ranged between $7-45, which was higher than the 
average benefit pr-reform. At the same time the program encouraged cooperation 
between federal programs and municipal CCTs.171 It did this by vertically integrating 
BFP jointly with municipal programs, by establishing minimum standards for program 
operation, and by providing performance based financial incentive along with targeted 
training, capacity building, and monitoring. These strategies enabled the BFP program to 
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draw on the benefits of local municipality engagement, while expressing national values 
for desired outcomes. 172 
Evaluating Brazil’s Social Policy:  
As the previous section demonstrates, the evolution of social policy in Brazil both 
directly reflected and sought to share positive social norms and valued outcomes. Brazil’s 
social policy was largely based on a belief in a social debt to the historically marginalized 
poor, as well as a conviction that all citizens had intrinsic rights to minimal levels of 
income, basic healthcare, and education. These principles were formally adopted in the 
constitutional reform of 1988. Throughout the reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s they 
became widely adopted values, something which was reflected in the broad support 
conditionality programs received from all sides of the political spectrum. The targeted 
populations as well as the conditionalities associated with the Bolsa Escola Program, as 
well as subsequent CCTs, explicitly aimed to fulfill society’s debt by providing the 
minimum basic conditions entitled by citizenship. They also aimed to incorporate 
community values and promote social inclusion in order to integrate the poor into the 
social and political structure. Its decentralized structure promoted community and local 
political engagement in its outcomes, as well as enabling the development of contextual 
solutions for local problems.  
Brazil’s CCT programs have been successful in part because of widely shared 
beliefs in its underlying values, as well as the efficiency its vertical integration and local 
engagement has achieved.  Because the social policy debate in Brazil has so explicitly 
engaged social values and valued outcomes, it is an ideal case for using the continuum 
                                                 
172
 Lindber et al, The Nuts and bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program: Implementing 
Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized  Context 14-15 
115 
 
developed in Chapter to analyze social policy and value structures. This section is going 
to use the ordered continuum to analyze how different philosophical positions inform us 
about the debate regarding conditionality, and the outcomes and tradeoffs of particular 
program designs. Though this analysis is by no means complete, it serves as an example 
of how a policymaker can use different philosophical frameworks to evaluate 
redistributive policies and conditionality.  
A Nozickean, evaluating the Brazilian experience through a libertarian 
framework, would likely conclude that, like most redistributive programs, the Brazilian 
CCT does not constitute legitimate transfers of wealth from the rich to the poor. Even 
though there was gross inequality, it is difficult to make the case that the impoverished 
have dropped below the minimum conditions which require redistribution. Broad 
political support does not justify the program either, because redistribution would 
constitute illegitimate takings from the wealthy members of society who do not support 
the program, not to mention it would overstep the bounds of the minimal state.  
While broad social redistribution may not be justified, the idea of a social debt 
may make some redistribution legitimate. In particular, it is possible that indigenous 
populations would be entitled to rectitude because historically illegitimate transfers 
robbed them of their natural endowments. Similarly, it is possible that the principle of 
rectitude could come into play if the authoritarian state used its power to force 
illegitimate transfers on the underprivileged. If the principle of rectitude is applied, a 
Nozickean would not argue for a government sponsored CCT program, instead opting for 
a direct cash transfer equivalent to the welfare loss of their foregone endowment.  
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 Many of the outcomes and underlying values which are prevalent in the Brazilian 
redistribution program are strikingly similar to arguments made by John Rawls. A 
Rawlsian would agree with the assertion that a minimum income, a basic level of 
healthcare, and access to education are necessary for establishing the preconditions for 
the principles of justice. He would agree with the worry about high levels of inequality, 
arguing that inequality which does not meet the maxi-min principle should be 
redistributed. Similarly, the program sought to establish equality of opportunity for the 
impoverished to participate in social, economic and political institutions, a goal which is 
in accordance with part one of the second principle of justice.  
The evolution of the Bolsa Escola program directly accords with a Rawlsian value 
structure: its decentralized municipal roots allowed the program to incorporate 
community members, promoting social inclusion, community building, and social 
cooperation. The eventual adoption of a national program under the NBEP is in 
accordance with the broad social value structure which Rawls argues must be adopted on 
a national basis, and helps to fulfill the difference principle on a national level. Increased 
oversight and efficiency also helps to establish just institutions which provide equality of 
opportunity. Conditionalities focused on human capital development are justified because 
the programs are targeted to marginalized individuals, who have not yet met the 
background conditions for the first or second principle of justice,  
A Ripsteinian neo-Kantian analysis of the Brazilian social policy debate would 
focus on the historical and current level of political exclusion, as well as the progress 
towards establishing the rightful conditions of social interaction. In particular, the notion 
of a social debt owed to the poor because of previous political marginalization directly 
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accords with Ripstein’s position that a united will is necessary for self legislation. 
Because the poor were excluded from the previous political regime, distributions in order 
to establish the rightful conditions for a united will is necessary for the government to be 
legitimate. The idea of fundamental rights of citizens directly accords with the concept of 
a necessary baseline for establishing the rightful condition. Emphasizing education and 
health is an effective means of achieving political participation, while also being a 
legitimate use of state action in order to establish the rightful conditions. 
 Conditionalities are justified because the rightful condition necessary for 
autonomy has not yet been established. Decentralization and incorporating local elements 
in developing and designing programmatic structures and outcomes facilitates local 
political participation, and is a step towards achieving political legitimacy. The uniform 
support these programs have from multiple levels of the political and socio-economic 
spectrum is an important step in establishing a united will among the citizenry. The 
uniformity established with the NBEP is on the one hand beneficial, because it ensures 
that a greater number of people will receive transfers capable of establishing the rightful 
conditions, but on the other hand it limits local cohesion, as some municipal autonomy is 
rescinded. A true valuation depends on the contextual social and demographic 
characteristics in a particular community in question.  
A freedoms based approach would be in favor of many of the program’s goals and 
outcomes.   The program primarily targeted the development of political, social and 
economic freedoms. In establishing a minimum level of welfare the program endeavored 
to create the minimum conditions for economic and social inclusion. Its decentralized 
targeting mechanisms and use of conditionality promoted a feeling of shared interest in 
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its outcomes. This is reflected in the universal political support the program has received, 
which decreases the potential for social marginalization. Local participation also enabled 
the development of appropriate outcomes designed in accordance with contextual 
valuations of capabilities. The program’s method of human capital accumulation 
addresses capabilities which have both intrinsic and instrumental value. These freedoms 
are reinforced by its political and social elements. The NBEP, when implemented, 
provided some guarantee of transparency, equity, and efficiency, which in turn 
encouraged a feeling of social cohesion and support for the program. Conditionalities 
would be justified, as the small restriction on economic freedom results in increases in 
short run social freedom and physical well-being, along with long run increases in 
economic, social, and political freedoms.  
A utilitarian analysis of the Brazilian CCT debate would focus on the society’s 
aggregate levels of welfare at different stages in the program’s development.  In one 
respect this simplifies the matter, as particular design features can be analyzed on a 
consequentialist basis, adjusting for unexpected outcomes. It is likely that the broad 
feeling of a debt to the poor combined with a higher marginal utility for transfers, and 
increasing returns which come from conditionality, would justify the implementation of 
extensive redistributive policies. Additionally, it is likely that the increased aggregate 
amount of wealth transfer under the NBEP combined with increased efficiency which 
resulted from adopting uniform standards would lead a utilitarian to support 
redistribution at the federal level. At the same time, community targeting could enable 
wealth transfers to go to those individuals who most need, meaning one would get a 
higher marginal utility for a particular transfer. Thus, the utilitarian position on 
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centralization depends on the contextual factors which determine what utility outcomes 
result from different arrangements.  
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Conclusion: 
 
 This thesis sought to develop a framework which policymakers can use to 
analyze conditional cash transfer programs in accordance with a particular value 
structure. Adopting the normative position that there are certain values interconnected 
with outcomes which we want to embrace, it has analyzed whether different 
philosophical positions would argue that CCTs are justified. This exercise has revealed, 
depending on the philosophical position embraced, a policymaker may oppose or 
completely endorse CCTs for a number of reasons. These different positions would also 
dictate not just whether you are going to have CCTs or not, but also how they are going 
to be designed and what the nature of the conditionalities will be.  
In order to effectively compare the implications of different value systems it 
developed a continuum which can be used to evaluate the trade-offs of conditionality. 
This framework was employed in Chapter V to analyze the debate about and evolution of 
conditional cash transfer programs in Brazil. These exercise showed how different 
philosophical frameworks could be employed to evaluate conditionality in a particular 
context. Additionally, this thesis has argued that social norms and shared value structures 
play a pivotal role in effective use of conditionality requires an understanding of the 
relevant social norms, entitlements, and their interconnectedness. With this knowledge in 
hand, it has examined how different CCT design structures can use contextual factors to 
promote human dignity in accordance with a particular value structure.  
 While much of this thesis has focused on analyzing philosophical frameworks, it 
has argued that these positions have direct implications on policy creation. As the case 
study of Brazil demonstrated, different philosophical positions are constantly used as 
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justifications in debates over CCTs. In order to fully analyze the implications of a CCT 
program, it is important to make the philosophical underpinnings more explicit. This will 
allow everyone to be able to fully understand what the trade-offs are. Only with this fuller 
understanding can we properly design and implement effective and appropriate CCT 
programs capable of promoting human dignity.   
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